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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Sticks and Stones Will Break My Bones,
but Will Racist Humor?: A Look Around
the World at Whether Police Officers Have
a Free Speech Right to Engage in Racist
Humor
* "Batten down the hatches, several thousand Zulus approaching
from the North."'
* "We have his oriental buddy for 11364."
"Great... make sure u burn him if he's on felony probation ...
by the way does he need any breaking."'2
* "Hi... just got mexercise for the night.' 3
I. INTRODUCTION
Above are just a few examples of what police call "blue humor."
Covering the gamut of racist, sexist, and homophobic speech 4 blue
1. Los Angeles Police Department Computer Message (July 9, 1990), quoted in Geral-
dine Baum et al., What Does Cop Talk Really Say?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at Al.
2. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DE-
PARTMENT 51 (July 1991) [hereinafter REPORT]. The Independent Commission, also known
as the Christopher Commission, was created by Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley to investi-
gate the use of excessive force following the initial public outcry in response to the Rodney
King beating. For a detailed description of the events leading up to and following the King
beating, see infra note 7.
3. REPORT, supra note 2, at 72.
4. Although blue humor also includes sexist and homophobic speech, this Comment
will concentrate exclusively on racist blue humor. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 87-89. The
first two can be evidenced by statements such as
* "U wont believe this ... that female call [sic] again said susp returned ... I'll
check it out then I'm going to stick my baton in her."
" "No but I left a 14 year old girl that I me [sic] yesterday handcuffed naked o [sic]
my chin-up bar wearing nothing but a blind-fold and salad oil... I'd like to ck on
her."
" "No. 1600 how many homosexuals did you give orals to today."
"That's a touchy subject ... not fit for MDTing."
* "Houston PD has a new chief-Elizabeth Watson 40 yrs old."
"I bet that's going over reeeeeaaalll good with the troops dude... they have some
dyke bleding [sic] heart for a mayor."
Id.
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humor constitutes the "grosser aspects of cop joking."5 Apparently,
police funny bones are "hooked up a little differently than those of the
rest of the world."' 6 However, it was not until the investigations fol-
lowing the infamous Rodney King beating that the rest of the world
discovered just how different.
7
Although graphic, the King beating constituted only a symptom
of a larger problem of abuse,8 and was merely one "example of wide-
spread, racially motivated 'street justice' administered by some in the
LAPD." 9 The beating elicited a huge public outcry, in response to
which Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley created the Independent
Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department ("Commission")
to investigate the use of excessive force by police.10 The Commission
conducted a computerized study of complaints filed against specific
5. Id.
6. Baum et al., supra note 1, at Al.
7. On March 3, 1991, three uniformed officers of the Los Angeles Police Department
("LAPD") beat Rodney G. King, a 25-year-old African-American, while their sergeant and a
large group of LAPD, California Highway Patrol ("CHP"), and Los Angeles Unified School
District officers watched. REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. The officers clubbed King with 56 baton
strokes, and kicked him in the head and torso. Id. Unbeknownst to the officers, an amateur
videographer, George Holliday, taped the vicious beating. Id.
The beating followed a high-speed automobile chase in which King had refused to stop.
Id. at 4. By the time he did stop, 11 LAPD units and a helicopter had joined the CHP's
original pursuit. Id. at 5. The LAPD officers ordered King and his two companions to exit
the car and lie flat on the ground. Id. at 6. King's two passengers, Bryant Allen and Freddie
Helms, complied with the officers' commands. Id. at 7. King, however, only lowered himself
to his hands and knees. Id. at 6. For King's failure to obey, Sergeant Stacey Koon shocked
King twice with a Taser electric stun gun. Sergeant Koon considered King "disoriented and
unbalanced" and under the influence of narcotics. Id. In response to King's attempt to rise,
the Holliday video shows one of the officers clubbing King in the head, and then striking him
several more times after King fell. Id. When King again tried to rise, a second officer joined
the first in repeatedly striking King with baton blows. Id. at 7. Sergeant Koon ordered the
two officers to use "power strokes" aimed at King's joints, wrists, elbows, knees, and ankles.
Id. Fifty-six baton blows and six kicks later, a group of officers swarmed over King and physi-
cally restrained him with both handcuffs and cordcuffs. They then dragged King on his stom-
ach to the roadside and awaited the arrival of an ambulance. Id.
The ambulance transported King to Pacifica Hospital of the Valley, where he received 20
stitches, including five on the inside of his mouth. Id. at 8. Medical records indicated he also
suffered fractures in his cheekbone and right ankle. Id. King's blood-alcohol level of 0.075%
was below the California intoxication level of 0.08%. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 23152(b) (West
Supp. 1992). Although other test results indicated "traces" of marijuana, no evidence of any
other illegal drug surfaced. REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. The police charged King with evading
arrest and held him for four days, releasing him only after prosecutors found insufficient evi-
dence to proceed. Id.
8. REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Id. at ii.
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police officers and examined over 3.6 million Mobile Digital Terminal
("MDT") communications made by Los Angeles Police Department
("LAPD") officers over a sixteen-month period from November 1989
to March 1991.11 The Report revealed that a significant number of
LAPD officers repeatedly used excessive force, in violation of LAPD
guidelines.' 2 The MDT communications contained brazen references
to beatings and other excesses, providing graphic confirmation of im-
proper attitudes and practices regarding the use of force. 13 Some of-
ficers used the MDT system to voice their excitement of pursuit,
viewing the chase as an opportunity for violence.' 4 Others eagerly
communicated their desire to be involved in shooting incidents: "I
almost got me a Mexican last night but he dropped the dam [sic] gun
to [sic] quick, lots of wit."15 Many MDT transmissions revealed the
speakers' twisted enjoyment derived from beating suspects: "Capture
11. Id. at iii, x.
12. Id. at iii.
13. Id. Although the majority of the police communications were routine, the contents
of some MDT transmissions were indicative of officers' tolerance for violence:
" "Did U educate him."
"Take 1 handcuff off and slap him around."
"He is crying to [sic] hard and there is [sic] 4 detectives here."
"Well dont [sic] seatbelt him in and slam on the brakes a couple times on the way
to the sta .... "
* "U missed out bro, we backed 2x53 [a patrol unit] on a poss shots fired from veh.
[S]ome of the susps had some big boot marks on their heads, once they were in
custody."
* "The last load went to a family of illegals living in the brush along side the pas fwy
* .. I thought the woman was going to cry.., so I hit her with my baton."
"Did U arrest the 85yr old lady of [sic] just beat her up."
"We just slapped her around a bit... she/s getting m/t [medical treatment] right
now."
Id. at 49-51.
14. Id. at xi, 53-54. The MDT transmissions included the following statements:
" "Im gonna bk my pursuit susp. Hope he gets ugly so I can vent my hate. Hrr hrr
... A-H"
* "Getting energy for the foot pursuit and shooting... I won't lose the susp."
Id. at 53, 54.
15. Id. at xi, xii, 52-53. Other examples of officer eagerness to shoot include the
following:
" "Go get em my-man, and shoot him twice for me."
" "Looking to end 1990 with a good shotgun killing ruggg"
"Raa a full moon and a full gun make for rewards from god"
"A full moon and a full gun makes for a night of fun"
"Everybody you kill in the line of duty becomes a slave in the afterlife"
"Then U will have a lot of slaves ... [.]
" "I shoulda shoot [sic] 'em huh, I missed another chance dammmmmm."
"I am getting soft."
" "If I find it itl [sic] be ois [officer-involved shooting] time. God I wanna to kill
something o so bad ......
Id. at 52, 53.
854 Loy. L.A. Int7 & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 14:851
him, beat him and treat him like dirt .... ,,16
The MDT communications also revealed that racism and bias
exist alongside the LAPD's excessive force problem. 17 The Commis-
sion found an appreciable number of disturbing and recurrent racial
slurs. 18 Some statements described minorities by using animal analo-
gies, while others derided their ethnic origins. 19 Overall, the Commis-
sion found 1450 instances of objectionable language in the MDT
communications. 20 Indeed, shortly before the King incident, the pa-
trol unit involved in the beating transmitted that a domestic dispute
between an African-American couple was "right out of 'Gorillas in
the Mist,' "21 a reference to a motion picture about the study of Afri-
can gorillas. 22 In addition, although the officers involved in the King
beating denied any use of racial epithets or slurs, an "enhanced au-
16. Id. at x-xi, 49-52. Examples from the MDT transmissions illustrate just how much
some officers enjoy beating suspects:
" "No problemmm... we R hungry ... we got a little physical w/a [name omitted]
on Columbus... it was fun.., we had to teach him a little respect... for the
police... hahahahaha... we had fun ... no stick time though."
* "[Name omitted] wanno go over to Delano later and hand out some street justice
" "[It] was fun .. [.] but no chance to bust heads . . [.] sorry."
"Oh well ... maybe next time."
Id. at 49, 51.
17. Id. at iv, xii.
18. Id. at 72.
19. Id.
20. Baum et al., supra note 1, at Al. Other examples of racist MDT messages include the
following:
" "Well... I'm back over here in the projects, pissing off the natives."
* "I would love to drive down Slauson with a flame thrower.., we would have a
barbeque."
* "Sounds like monkey slapping time."
" "Oh always dear... what's happening.., we're huntin wabbits."
"Actually, muslim wabbits."
"Just over here on this arson/homicide ... be careful one of those rabbits don't
bite you."
"Yeah I know ... Huntin wabbits is dangerous."
* "Don't be flirting with all ur cholo girlfriends."
REPORT, supra note 2, at 72.
It is impossible to determine how widespread this language is among the LAPD's 8300
officers. Baum et al., supra note 1, at Al. Although an aide to former Los Angeles Police
Chief Daryl F. Gates pointed out that the offensive messages represented only 0.04% of all
transmissions, most of the transmissions were "informational," such as officers telling each
other that they had arrived at a scene or were on their way somewhere. Id. Because only a
minority of the messages were "conversational," the offensive communications constituted a
much higher percentage of the conversational transmissions than of the total. Id.
21. REPORT, supra note 2, at 14, 71.
22. GORILLAS IN THE MIST: THE ADVENTURE OF DIAN FOSSEY (Warner Brothers &
Universal Pictures 1989).
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dio" version of the Holliday videotape23 indicates that during the
beating, an officer yelled, "[N]igger, hands behind your back-your
back."
24
Conduct and statements directed at minority officers also illus-
trate the racism and bias found within the LAPD. 25 MDT messages
and other evidence demonstrate that minority officers are still fre-
quently subjected to racial slurs, comments, and discriminatory
treatment.
26
The MDT transmissions show complete disregard for the LAPD
policy prohibiting the dissemination of racist messages.2" In fact, the
officers made the statements despite being fully aware that their state-
ments were monitored. 28 Further, few complaints against racial com-
ments have been sustained by the LAPD, 29 and those that were
sustained resulted in only minor penalties.30 While only a small
23. This enhanced audio version of the videotape was aired by a Los Angeles public
television station, KCET. By the Year 2000: "Policing the Police" (KCET television broad-
cast, May 7, 1991).
24. REPORT, supra note 2, at 14, 71. However, the Los Angeles County District Attor-
ney's enhanced audio version was described as "inconclusive." Id. In addition, attorneys from
both sides have debated the value of a second video recording taken by an apartment complex
security guard standing across the street from the King beating. See Jerry Seper, Value of
Second Rodney King Tape Debated, WASH. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1992, at A5. The attorney initially
representing King in his suit against the LAPD, Steve Lerman, insisted the second video
clearly substantiates that the officers shouted racial epithets at King while beating and kicking
him. Id. In contrast, attorneys representing the defendant officers believed that the second
video tape "shows absolutely nothing" and is "curious at best." Id.
25. REPORT, supra note 2, at xiii, 78.
26. Id.
27. The LAPD policy against racist messages states:
This Memorandum reaffirms the Department policy concerning racially or ethnically
oriented remarks, slurs, epithets, terminology, or language of a derogatory nature.
These remarks are an inappropriate form of communication which becomes a de-
structive wedge in relationships with peers and members of the community. The
deliberate or casual use of racially or ethnically derogatory language by Department
employees is misconduct and will not be tolerated under any circumstances.
Unacceptable Remarks of a Racial Nature, Memorandum No. 1 (Apr. 24, 1987), quoted in
REPORT, supra note 2, at 73.
28. REPORT, supra note 2, at 52.
29. Id. at 73-74.
30. Id. During the seven-year period between 1984 and 1990, the LAPD sustained only
two complaints for the transmission of improper messages over the MDT. In one case, the
officer was admonished. In the second case, the verbal assailant and his victim, both police
officers, received suspensions. The second case involved a Caucasian male officer who trans-
mitted a vulgar sexual and racial remark to an African-American female officer who responded
over the MDT with angry profanities. While the commanding officer recommended a four-day
suspension for the Caucasian male officer and a two-day suspension for the African-American
female officer, the Chief of Police reduced both suspensions to one day. Id.
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number of LAPD officers are openly racist, their attitudes and behav-
ior have greatly impacted the LAPD due to its failure to enforce anti-
racial policies consistently. 31 This failure conveys to both the public
and the officers themselves that the LAPD condones such conduct.32
However, even if the LAPD were to enforce its policies, an issue
exists as to whether police officers have a free speech right to make
such statements. In addressing this issue, this Comment first consid-
ers the perspectives of both the officers and their victims. It then ana-
lyzes racist blue humor within the framework of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and concludes that police officers have
neither a First nor a Fourteenth Amendment right to engage in such
humor. After examining the international condemnation of racist
speech and providing an overview of several foreign legislative
prohibitions against it, this Comment then determines that police of-
ficers do not have an international right to engage in racist humor.
Finally, this Comment proposes an enforceable regulation designed to
eliminate racist blue humor.
II. THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLICE OFFICERS AND THEIR VICTIMS
A. The Police Officers' Perspective
Police officers defend the crassness of their humor. They argue
that "although [their comments] are unacceptable when directed
against private citizens, . . . such language is a necessary evil, a slang,
meant to cement bonds between co-workers in a grisly and dispiriting
job and to exclude everybody else."' 33 A typical reaction
is to consider the incidents isolated pranks, the product of sick-but-
harmless minds. This is in part a defensive reaction: a refusal to
believe that real people, people just like us, are racists. This disso-
ciation leads logically to the claim that there is no institutional or
state responsibility to respond to the incident. It is not the kind of
real and pervasive threat that requires the state's power to quell.34
One detective, a ten-year LAPD member and women's coordina-
tor whose job includes training officers to avoid sexual harassment,
concurred, stating, "We don't have 8,300 bigots on this job."' 35
31. Id. at xiii.
32. Id.
33. Baum et al., supra note 1, at A14.
34. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2327 (1989).
35. Baum et al., supra note 1, at A14.
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Although she considered some of the transmissions unprofessional
and stupid, she also believed they merely reflected "dark humor and a
lot of mouthing off."' 36 To this detective, "Capture him, beat him and
treat him like dirt" signified nothing more than an attempt to imitate
"Superman talk":
37
It's ego, bragging, a musical pattern in language, coming from
some guy who probably has spent all day in court, hasn't seen his
family, hasn't slept, just got exposed to a suspect with syphilis, had
to search a female between her crotch for drugs, saw a baby
thrown against a wall.... It's occupational joking, but not some-
thing you act on.38
Similarly, one former police officer characterized the Commis-
sion report as "inherently" trivial because it ignored the psychology
underlying the offensive remarks. 39 He stated,
We have in police work, not just in Los Angeles but everywhere
... super-aggressive 22-year-olds full of testosterone, full of energy,
absolutely immortal and unable to admit fear, unable to verbalize
fear-even to themselves .... Hence, they get caught in all this
damn silly defense-mechanism business, this dehumanizing gallows
humor and all of that-and don't even understand that they are
doing it most of the time.40
However, even this former officer acknowledged that some of the hu-
mor went too far: "Can I define when it goes beyond that, what the
dominant group does in joking ethnically with his fellow officers? No.
But I know it when I see it. Some of this definitely goes beyond the
pale .... It should not be tolerated.
'41
One Caucasian thirty-year veteran of the LAPD even proffered
an inoffensive context for the Gorillas in the Mist comment transmit-
ted the evening of the King beating. 42 Noting that the movie showed
naturalist Dian Fossey suddenly surrounded by a group of apes while
she was observing one gorilla, the detective conjectured that while







42. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 14, 71; see also supra notes 21-22 and accompanying
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rounded by people.43 Thus, the reference ostensibly could be viewed
as having no racial implication. 44 However, the detective conceded
that interpreting "gorillas" to mean African-Americans was "the
more obvious interpretation," but found it unfair and inflammatory
"to seize on it and call it racist. ' 45
Defenders of blue humor recognize that racist messages are un-
acceptable. Nevertheless, they contend that blue humor is a necessary
evil, serving to bond co-workers in the grueling fight against crime.
They argue that forcing officers to censor their language polarizes the
races within the LAPD.
Defending blue humor, however, ignores the racial polarity such
comments create and disregards minority officers' feelings. Many mi-
nority officers perceive no benefits resulting from the crude language,
not even the camaraderie that allegedly arises from its use.46 In addi-
tion, it is hard to understand how a Caucasian officer calling an Afri-
can-American officer "nigger," an Hispanic officer "wetback" or
"'cholo," or an Asian-American officer "chink," "jap," or "gook,"
builds camaraderie among the races. It is also difficult to imagine
how these terms are "humorous."
Blue humor defenders argue that the racial comments do not re-
flect racial animus, but instead provide officers with a method of let-
ting off steam after a long, hard day on the streets. People recognize
and certainly appreciate that police work is extremely dangerous and
that many routine arrests can suddenly turn into violent confronta-
tions. However, a stressful work environment does not justify vicious
verbal assaults on the very people, including minorities, whom officers
have sworn to serve and protect.
In addition, blue humor defenders contend that racist humor be-
comes dangerous only "when it conveys to a young cop that these
people-a whole class of people, victims and criminals alike-are not
to be served, not to be taken seriously."' 47 However, that statement
betrays the very problem at hand: Certain officers not only believe
43. Baum et al., supra note 1, at A14.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. One retired officer stated that his complaints resulted in a lecture. Although he found
nothing amusing about being called a "nigger" while serving in the Hawthorne Police Depart-
ment, the officer was specifically told not to be offended, "because [he] was not black, [he] was
blue." Id. at AI5. With regard to the argument that racial insults cement the bond between
officers, this retired officer stated, "That is a lot of garbage. Anyone who knows what black
people and Latinos have experienced in this country historically wouldn't say that." Id.
47. Baum et al., supra note 1, at A14.
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that minorities are not to be taken seriously, but also that minorities
should bear the brunt of the officers' physical aggressions, resulting in
police brutality. 4
8
Even adamant defenders of blue humor admit that officers must
tone down the basest "cop talk" and develop a better rapport with the
public and among themselves.49 Yet some police argue that eliminat-
ing blue humor entirely would "force them to sound like high school
English teachers, which would cost them stature with their peers."
50
Verbally harassing a minority group, however, cannot be the only
method available to an officer wishing to increase his or her stature
among fellow officers.
B. The Victims' Perspective
Undoubtedly, "mere words, whether racial or otherwise, can
cause mental, emotional, or even physical harm to their target."'s Be-
cause of the long and unattractive history of racial discrimination in
the United States,52 racial insults are qualitatively different and poten-
tially more harmful than other types of insults.53 Accordingly, two
major arguments exist for limiting racist speech. One argument
adopts the premise that restricting racist speech will curtail the spread
of racist ideas.54 The second argument views limitations on racist
speech as protecting the victims from further mental and physical
48. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text for examples of MDT transmissions
revealing officer eagerness to engage in physical brutality.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 143 (1982) (citing Wilkinson v. Downton,
[1897] 2 Q.B. 57 (Eng.) (plaintiff suffered permanent physical harm as a result of defendant
falsely telling plaintiff that her husband had broken both legs in an accident)); see also State
Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952) (threats of physical assault on
plaintiff caused him to become ill and vomit); Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, 100 So.
2d 396 (Fla. 1958) (insulting language caused plaintiff to suffer mental or emotional distress,
an ensuing heart attack, and aggravation of a pre-existing heart disease); Alcorn v. Anbro
Eng'g Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970) (plaintiff suffered emotional and physical distress, became
sick for several weeks, was unable to work, and sustained shock, nausea, and insomnia after his
superintendent intentionally disparaged his race in a rude, violent, and insolent manner).
52. See, e.g., GILBERT OSOFSKY, THE BURDEN OF RACE (1968); ANTI-SEMITISM IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (Daird Gerber ed., 1986); RICHARD DUNNON, KEEPER OF CONCEN-
TRATION CAMPS (1987); GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE ARROGANCE OF RACE (1988);
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987).
53. Delgado, supra note 51, at 143, 157.
54. David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOzO L. REV. 445, 455
(1987).
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harm."5
1. Curtailing Racism
As the primary means of human communication, speech influ-
ences ideas, beliefs, and attitudes. 56 Thus, racist speech can influence
the thinking of nonracists and racists alike.57 Racist messages color
society's institutions and are passed on to succeeding generations with
the result that "[n]ot only the victim of a racial insult but also his or
her children, future generations, and our entire society are harmed by
racial invective and the tradition of racism which it furthers. '5 8 Thus,
racist speech contributes to discrimination and other racial
problems.5
9
Racism persists because society tolerates or encourages it.60 The
"confrontation theory" suggests that overt signs of racism may be
curtailed when offenders know punishment will follow. 61 According
to this theory, the mere existence of laws prohibiting certain racist
acts will prevent most people from engaging in them.62 Also, the
threat of public censure and denouncement will lead many potential
racists to restrain themselves. 63 Moreover, this change will not be
merely external. Over time, racists will internalize the rules, and their
desire to engage in racist behavior will eventually weaken. 64 There-
fore, curbing racial speech could inhibit or perhaps eliminate the
spread of racist ideas, actions, and prejudices.
65
55. Id. at 456.
56. Id. at 462.
57. Id.
58. Delgado, supra note 51, at 173.
59. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 462.
60. Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision,
85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 374 (1991) (citing GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJU-
DICE 337-38 (25th anniversary ed. 1979)); PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM
20-21 (2d ed. 1978)).
61. For a more thorough analysis of the confrontation theory, see generally IRWIN
KATZ, STIGMA-A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 16, 109 (1981); Frank R. Westie, The Ameri-
can Dilemma: An Empirical Test, 30 AM. SOC. REV. 527, 529 (1965).
62. Delgado, supra note 60, at 374.
63. Id.
64. Id.; ALLPORT, supra note 60, at 470-71; Westie, supra note 61, at 529, 533; see also
Irwin Katz & Patricia Gurin, Race Relations and the Social Sciences: Overview and Further
Discussion, in RACE AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 342, 473 (Irwin Katz & Patricia Gurin eds.,
1969).
65. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 456; Delgado, supra note 60, at 374; ALLPORT, supra




everywhere the crosses are burning,
sharp-shooting goose-steppers around every corner,
there are snipers in the schools...
(I know you don't believe this.
You think this is nothing
but faddish exaggeration. But they
are not shooting at you.)
I'm marked by the color of my skin.
The bullets are discrete and designed to kill slowly.
They are aiming at my children.
These are the facts
Let me show you my wounds: my stumbling mind, my
"excuse me" tongue, and this
nagging preoccupation
with the feeling of not being good enough.
66
One of the most direct harms suffered by victims of racist speech
is severe mental or emotional distress, which results because "[r]acist
hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets, and disparagement all hit the
gut of those in the target group." 67 The psychological and physiologi-
cal symptoms of emotional distress include fear, rapid pulse rate lead-
ing to breathing difficulties, nightmares, post-traumatic stress
disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide.68 Other effects include
displaced aggression, avoidance, retreat, withdrawal, and alcohol-
ism. 69 The severity of the emotional distress has led one commentator
to refer to the blow of racist messages as "spirit murder," alluding to
the effect of such speech on a victim's psyche. 70
Racist speech destroys self-esteem and sense of personal secur-
ity.71 Victims often restrict their personal freedom to avoid receiving
66. Lorna Dee Cervantes, Poem for the Young White Man Who Asked Me How I an
Intelligent Well-Read Person Could Believe in the War Between Races, in MARTA ESTER
SANCHEZ, CONTEMPORARY CHICANA POETRY: A CRITICAL APPROACH TO AN EMERGING
LITERATURE 90 (1985).
67. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2332.
68. Id. at 2336.
69. Id. at 2336 n.84.
70. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger, The Discourse of Fingerpointing as
the Law's Response to Racism, 42 MIAMI L. REv. 127, 139 (1987).
71. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2337. "To be hated, despised, and alone is the ultimate
fear of all human beings." Id. at 2338.
1992]
Loy. LA. Int7 & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 14:851
hate messages. 72 Many have terminated employment, forgone educa-
tion, left their homes, avoided certain public places, curtailed their
own exercise of free speech, and otherwise modified their behavior.73
Often, hate speech acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy, creating "in the
victim those very traits of 'inferiority' that [the message] ascribes to
him."74
Government toleration of racist speech intensifies the loneliness
and alienation experienced by its victims.75 When police officers pro-
tect racist marchers76 and courts refuse redress for racial insult,77 vic-
tims are left with no recourse.78 The pain is markedly augmented
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2337 & n.86. For examples of such withdrawal from society, see Sambos Res-
taurants, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 703 (6th Cir. 1981) (Keith, J., dissenting)
(noting that African-Americans tend to avoid public facilities with racially offensive names);
GEORGIA STATE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PERCEPTIONS OF
HATE GROUP ACTIVITY IN GEORGIA 20 (1982) (case of a 14-year-old boy who was the subject
of a Ku Klux Klan leafleting campaign and became so frightened that he dropped out of
school); Richard Blake Dent, Klanwatch Threatens Hate Groups with a Frightening Prospect-
Exposure. Even Bullies Can Be Afraid Sometimes, STUDENT LAW., Dec. 1984, at 48 (describ-
ing how an African-American Naval Reserve ensign resigned from officers' school after threats
from the "Navy KKK"); Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2337 n.86 (recounting Professor Judith
Weightman's findings that Japanese-Americans avoid discrimination by avoiding places, orga-
nizations, and events that perpetuate an anti-Japanese philosophy); HARRY H.L. KrrANO,
RACE RELATIONS 65-79 (3d ed. 1985) (discussing ways minorities avoid situations where they
expect to encounter prejudice).
74. Delgado, supra note 51, at 146 (quoting MARTIN DEUTSCH ET AL., SOCIAL CLASS,
RACE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 175 (1968)); Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2339
("[A]t some level, no matter how much both victims and well-meaning dominant-group mem-
bers resist it, racial inferiority is planted in our minds as an idea that may hold some truth.").
75. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2338.
76. See. e.g., 6 Protesters Arrested at Houston Klan March, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1983, at
23 (600 police in riot gear protected approximately 50 Ku Klux Klan marchers in Houston).
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that Nazis must be permitted to march in public
streets. See National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam) (reversing the
Illinois Supreme Court's denial of a stay of an injunction prohibiting the National Socialist
Party from demonstrating); Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (denying certiorari to the
Seventh Circuit decision invalidating Skokie ordinances that attempted to block Nazi demon-
strations). However, as Justice Blackmun correctly observed, "each court dealing with [this]
precise problem [has felt] the need to apologize for [that] result." Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. at
918 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1975)
(holding that the use of the word "nigger" and other race-related language by fellow employ-
ees did not constitute employment discrimination). The Howard court noted, "Against a large
part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation in a
community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law ever
could be." Id. at 606 (quoting Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the
Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1053 (1936)).
78. See Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2338.
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when the government goes beyond merely tolerating racism to ac-
tively promoting it2 9 Therefore, when police officers not only protect
the messages promulgated by racist marchers, but engage in racial
"humor" themselves, victims become defenseless and alienated.
The alienation affects not only the minority public but also the
minority officers within a police department. The harm to these mi-
nority officers who hear such racial insults on a daily basis is arguably
more severe because minority officers have even fewer avenues for re-
dress than minority civilians. Most are pressured into accepting de-
rogatory comments by fellow officers.80 In fact, many of the minority
officers interviewed after the Rodney King beating feared retaliation if
it became known that they spoke to the Commission. 81 These officers
feared being ostracized by their peers and worried that their careers
would suffer8 2 After being interviewed, one LAPD officer found a
hangman's noose on a station telephone he used every morning to call
home. 83 The officer did not report the incident to his supervisor be-
cause he was certain that nothing would be done in response to his
complaint.
84
In addition, given the rarity of registered complaints and the mi-
nor penalties imposed when such complaints are registered, 85 the
LAPD policy prohibiting racist messages has proven ineffective. 86
This failure to enforce the LAPD policy adversely influences in-
tradepartment acceptance and treatment of minority officers. It also
affects the way LAPD officers interact with the public, since "[t]o the
extent there is the perception of tolerance of racist behavior toward
other officers, it is likely to engender a greater acceptance of similar
behavior toward minority citizens."' 87
As a result of this tolerance of hate speech, minority officers may
view themselves in a negative light. 88 To deal with the racial insults
79. See Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979). In Harris, an African-American
police officer sued a Caucasian judge for conducting a "racially motivated campaign to dis-
credit and damage" the officer. Id. at 338. As part of this racial campaign, the judge referred
to the officer as a "black bastard." Id. at 333-36.
80. Baum et al., supra note 1, at A14.




85. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
86. For the text of the LAPD policy, see supra note 27.
87. REPORT, supra note 2, at 78, 79.
88. Baum et al., supra note 1, at A14.
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and perhaps to fit in with the Caucasian majority, minority officers
may even reject their own ethnic identity.8 9 Should this identity rejec-
tion occur, the price of disassociation may be sanity itself.9°
b. Physical Violence
These comments are a justification for all types of misconduct that
will follow... It's almost like they are psyching themselves up for
the violence and the mistreatment.91
Justice Holmes once observed that "[e]very idea is an incite-
ment" to action.92 This observation is supported by psychological
and sociological theorists who "stress that racist expression is 'a pre-
condition for acts of racial violence.' 93 The example most often
cited in support of the connection between racist speech and racist
action is that of German Naziism. 94 Adolf Hitler's anti-Semitic prop-
aganda ignited and inflamed existing anti-Semitic attitudes and beliefs
in Germany. 95 Without the freedom to disseminate his anti-Semitic
propaganda, it is unlikely that Hitler would have come to power.
Thus, the suppression of Hitler's hate speech likely would have spared
the lives of millions of Jews.96 Although one may argue that the ex-
tremes of the Nazi regime are unlikely to recur,97 racist speech per-
petuates racist attitudes and beliefs, which in turn lead to extreme
actions in times of turmoil.98 As stated by one commentator,
"[E]very epithet . . . heightens racial tensions and contributes to a
climate which often degenerates into violence." 99
Several examples in United States history demonstrate how racist
speech and racial violence are inextricably intertwined. 1°° In 1982,
anti-Japanese propaganda led to the death of a twenty-seven year old
89. See Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2337.
90. Id. (citing Joseph A. Baldwin, African Self-Consciousness and the Mental Health of
African-Americans, 15 J. BLACK STUD. 177 (1984) (a concept of "alien self" in African-Ameri-
cans results from identifying with Europeans)).
91. Baum et al., supra note 1, at A14.
92. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
93. Deborah R. Schwartz, Note, A First Amendment Justification for Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 733, 764 (quoting Kretzmer, supra note 54, at
463).
94. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 463.




99. Schwartz, supra note 93, at 764.
100. See Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2330; Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 465 & n.79.
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Chinese-American, Vincent Chin, on the eve of his wedding. 10 1 Using
baseball bats, two furloughed auto workers beat Chin to death, crush-
ing his skull. 10 2 While attacking Chin, the two assailants yelled,
"[I]t's because of you motherfucking Japs that we're out of work!"'
10 3
In addition, a recently released two-year investigation by the
United States Commission on Civil Rights concluded that when poli-
ticians engage in "Japan-bashing" to justify the United States' eco-
nomic problems, their comments often trigger violent acts toward
Asian-Americans. 10 4 On February 9, 1992, an unemployed United
States worker who had lost his job "because of the Japanese" stabbed
a Japanese businessman to death. 10 5 Although authorities tried to dis-
pel the notion that the murder was racially motivated, they could not
eliminate the possibility. 1°6  The attack renewed fears within the
Asian-American community sparked originally by the Chin
murder. 107
Finally, racist speech has an alarming influence on psychopathic
killers.'08 Many murders by such individuals have been precipitated
by racist propaganda. 109 For example, in New York, an attacker who
"feared Asians" pushed a pregnant, nineteen year old Chinese immi-
101. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S ASIAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER ADVISORY COMMITTEE FI-
NAL REPORT 43 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]; see also Christo-
pher Pummer, Anti-Japanese Threat is Only Lead in Killin& Crime: Deputies Say They Have
Little to Go on in Stabbing of Camarillo Businessman. The Murder Fuels Concern Among
Japanese-Americans, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1992, at A3.
102. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 101, at 43. A similar incident occurred
in 1983, when a Vietnamese-American high school student was stabbed to death, following
months of racial taunts and harassment. Id.
103. Id.
104. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES FACING ASIAN AMERI-
CANS IN THE 1990s (1992); see also Sam Fulwood III, Japan-Bashing Condemned by Rights
Panel, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1992, at Al ("Japan-bashing is on the rise across this nation
.... ); Alicia Brooks, Recent Japan-Bashing Could Increase Crimes Against Asians; Group
Urges Victims to Report to Police, SNS, Feb. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SNS
File. Japan-bashing by politicians was reinforced by the 50th anniversary of the Japanese at-
tack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1991. Steve Marantz, Asians Fear Pearl Harbor Hostility,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 1991, Metro/Region, at 29. "Remember Pearl Harbor" has become
a war cry for many people who use it as a license for anti-Asian violence. Id. These people
make no distinction in their attacks on Japanese, Japanese-Americans, and other Asian-Ameri-
cans. Id. In this manner, "anti-Japan sentiment results in violence against all Asian-Ameri-
cans on the basis of race." Id.
105. Pummer, supra note 101, at A3.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2332 n.70.
109. Id. at 2330.
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grant into the path of an oncoming subway train. 110 In a similar man-
ner, a schizophrenic murderer thought African-Americans were "like
animals, to be eaten."'11
The racist messages described in the Commission report further
illustrate the link between speech and violence. 112 As previously dis-
cussed, MDT messages transmitted by the LAPD over a sixteen
month period revealed that while most messages were routine, some
officers, using racist language, spoke of beating and mistreating crimi-
nal suspects and other members of the public. 113 The prejudicial atti-
tude communicated by those officers often led them to verbally harass
minorities, detain African-American and Latino men simply because
they fit generalized suspect descriptions, employ unnecessarily inva-
sive or humiliating tactics in minority neighborhoods, and use exces-
sive force.1 4 In a recent survey of LAPD officers, nearly twenty-five
percent of the responding officers indicated that they believed racial
bias exists in the police force and contributes to "negative interaction
between police and community." 115  Over twenty-seven percent
agreed that "an officer's prejudice toward the suspect's race may lead
to the use of excessive force." ' 1 6 One former police officer asserted, "I
think most people know your mouth is the window to your heart, and
these comments are not lighthearted.... These comments are a justi-
fication for all types of misconduct that will follow .... It's almost
like they are psyching themselves up for the violence and the
mistreatment."117
III. BALANCING THE FIRST AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS
As a sub-category of racist speech, blue humor must be analyzed
within the context of racist speech in general. It follows that any re-
strictions potentially limiting blue humor necessarily implicate First
and Fourteenth Amendment principles.
110. Id. at 2332 n.70; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 101, at 44.
111. Aric Press & Pamela Abramson, A Law for Racist Killers, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23,
1981, at 80.
112. REPORT, supra note 2, at 48.
113. Id. at 49, 53. For examples of such messages, see supra notes 13-16, 20.
114. REPORT, supra note 2, at xii.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Baum et al., supra note 1, at A14 (quoting Don Jackson, a retired officer of the Haw-
thorne Police Department who left the Department in 1987 after complaining of racism).
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A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech."" I8 Throughout the history
of the United States, freedom of expression has been considered one of
the most fundamental rights protected under the Constitution.'9 It
has been said that a "[d]emocratic, representative government
presumes that people are free to think and say whatever they might,
even the unthinkable."1 20 Justice Holmes immortalized this concept
in his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States:121
[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the ex-
pression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference
with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
check is required to save the country.... Only the emergency that
makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil
counsels to time warrants making any exception to the sweeping
command, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech."
22
Any limitation of speech based upon content presumptively vio-
lates the First Amendment. i23 At a minimum, the right to free speech
means that "government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."'' 24 Because
any regulation of racist speech is inherently content-based, it carries a
heavy presumption of invalidity.125
Although the prohibition against content-based regulations is
stringent, it is not absolute. I 26 If the government can show that a
regulation is necessary to further a compelling state interest, the regu-
lation may pass constitutional muster. 27 The Supreme Court has
118. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
119. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2349.
120. Id.
121. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 630-31.
123. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 790 (2d ed.
1988).
124. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding invalid an ordi-
nance that prohibited picketing in the vicinity of a school because, in allowing an exception for
labor union picketing, the state had not been content neutral).
125. Schwartz, supra note 93, at 749.
126. TRIBE, supra note 123, § 12-2, at 790 n.10; see also Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450,
1468 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that "a total ban on content-based regulations of any sort"
would require that First Amendment law be "revolutionized").
127. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980) (holding
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found compelling state interests in some cases, holding that the First
Amendment does not protect certain inherently harmful categories of
expression.1 28 These categories include group libel,129 incitement of
violence,130 and fighting words. 1 31 If racist blue humor can be charac-
terized as fitting within one of these categories, it may be regulated
based on its content.
1. Exceptions to Absolute Freedom of Expression
a. Group Libel
According to Thomas Emerson,
Group libel laws are designed to promote internal order by elimi-
nating or reducing friction among racial, religious, national or sim-
ilar groups. In general, they seek to prohibit, through criminal or
civil process, communications that are abusive, offensive, or derog-
atory with regard to a group, or that tend to arouse public con-
tempt, prejudice, or hatred toward the group.
132
In 1952, the Supreme Court, in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 33 upheld
the validity of group libel statutes by affirming the conviction of a
white supremacist under an Illinois law prohibiting the defamation of
groups on the basis of race or religion. 134 In so doing, the Court con-
sidered the state's history of violent racial strife, and concluded that
the state had a legitimate interest in maintaining its "peace and well-
that "the government [must] show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a
compelling state interest").
128. See TRIBE, supra note 123, § 12-8, at 837.
129. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 264-67 (1952) (holding that group defamation
based on race and religion can be regulated).
130. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (holding that the police can prevent a
breach of the peace when "the speaker passes bounds of argument or persuasion and under-
takes incitement to riot").
131. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining "fighting words"
as words that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace").
132. THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 391-92 (1970).
133. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
134. Id. at 264-67. The Illinois statute read, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufacture, sell, or offer
for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place in this state any
lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication or exhibition
portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, or
any race, color, creed or religion which said publication or exhibition exposes the
citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or
which is productive of breach of the peace or riots. ...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 471 (1949).
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being."1
35
However, the Beauharnais decision was the product of a five-to-
four split among the Justices. 136 Additionally, the Supreme Court's
subsequent holdings in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 137 and its
progeny have established clear limitations on a state's freedom to de-
fine and punish libel and slander. 38 As a result, courts and commen-
tators question whether Beauharnais remains good law.' 39 Indeed,
the Supreme Court in Beauharnais questioned the wisdom and effi-
cacy of group libel laws.140
Despite the Court's conflicting treatment of group libel laws,
Beauharnais has never been explicitly overruled.' 4' Also, eight of the
135. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258-61. The Court noted that
[i]n the face of this history... of extreme racial and religious propaganda, we would
deny experience to say that the Illinois legislature was without reason in seeking
ways to curb false or malicious defamation of racial and religious groups, made in
public places and by means calculated to have a powerful emotional impact on those
to whom it was presented.
Id. at 261.
136. Id. at 267 (Black, J., dissenting), 277 (Reed, J., dissenting), 284 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing), 287 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
137. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that damages for libel of public figures require a show-
ing of actual malice).
138. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Loraine Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990) (stressing that a
statement is actionable in a defamation suit only if a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
it implied an assertion of fact).
139. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 82 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing
that Beauharnais is a "misfit" and should be overruled); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (citing cases sharing "doubt... that Beauharnais
remains good law ... after the constitutional libel cases"); United States v. Handler, 383 F.
Supp. 1267, 1277-78 (D. Md. 1974) (questioning whether Beauharnais is still good law); see
also TRIBE, supra note 123, § 12-17, at 926-27 (noting that New York Times v. Sullivan
"seemed to some to eclipse Beauharnais' sensitivity to ... group defamation claims"); Del-
gado, supra note 60, at 376-77 (noting that "some commentators and courts have questioned
whether Beauharnais today would be decided differently"); Toni M. Massaro, Equality and
Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 219 (1991)
(noting that cases subsequent to Beauharnais "cast serious doubt upon whether that decision
remains good law"); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Propo-
sal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 518 ("Beauharnais is widely assumed no longer to be good law
....'1).
140. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 261-62. The Court in Beauharnais noted, "It may be
argued, and weightily, that this legislation will not help matters; that tension and on occasion
violence between racial and religious groups must be traced to causes more deeply embedded
in our society than the rantings of modern Know-Nothings." Id. The Court further stated,
"[I]t bears repeating ... that our finding that the law is not constitutionally objectionable
carries no implication of approval of the wisdom of the legislation or of its efficacy. These
questions may raise doubts in our minds as well as in others." Id. at 267.
141. Beauharnais is the only case in which the Supreme Court has expressly addressed
group libel. Strossen, supra note 139, at 518.
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Justices who decided the Beauharnais case expressly agreed that
states may regulate speech that defames a group if the statute is nar-
rowly drawn and appropriately applied.142 Subsequent Supreme
Court holdings demonstrate continuing judicial approval of Beauhar-
nais.143 Furthermore, libelous statements targeting private individu-
als, as opposed to public figures, still fall within the sphere of
permissible state regulation. 144
Yet, problems remain. Group libel laws cannot adequately pro-
tect victims when the defamatory speech contains no falsehoods.
145
Defamation only encompasses false statements of fact made without a
good faith belief in their veracity.146 Therefore, although racial in-
sults may be considered defamation, truth serves as a complete de-
fense, and racial groups "would hardly have their reputations or
psyches enhanced by a Uudicial] process in which the [defendant]
sought to prove his good faith belief in [the truth of his statements]
and [the plaintiffs] were required to demonstrate the absence
thereof."1
47
142. Justices Vinson, Burton, Clark, and Minton joined in Justice Frankfurter's majority
opinion. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 250. Although Justice Jackson dissented, he agreed that "a
State has power to bring classes 'of any race, color, creed or religion' within the protection of
its group libel laws, if indeed traditional forms do not already accomplish it." Id. at 299
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting section 224a of the Illinois Criminal Code, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 471 (1949)). Justice Douglas adopted a near-absolute position against the constitu-
tionality of state group libel laws, although he noted that extreme situations exist where group
libel may be punishable, namely when there is a conspiracy to defame a group or when clear
and present danger exists. Id. at 284-85 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Reed assumed that
states have the power "to pass group libel laws to protect the public peace," even though he
objected to the statute in Beauharnais on vagueness grounds. Id. at 283 (Reed, J., dissenting).
143. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982) (citing Beauharnais to
illustrate the legitimacy of content-based restrictions where "the evil to be restricted so over-
whelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake"); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 70
(approving of group libel statutes "designed to reach speech, such as group vilification, 'espe-
cially likely to lead to public disorders' ") (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7 cmt. (Tent.
Draft No. 13, 1961)).
144. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) ("States should retain
substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehoods injuri-
ous to the reputation of a private individual."); Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free
Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 35 (1985) (arguing
that Sullivan is "expressly limited to actions brought by public officials against critics of their
official conduct," and does not extend to libel suits by private citizens).






In 1919, Justice Holmes introduced the doctrine of "clear and
present danger" in Schenck v. United States. 48 The Schenck test con-
siders "whether the words used are used in circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent.' 49 Fifty years later, in Brandenburg v. Ohio,15° the Supreme
Court adopted the clear and present danger standard in establishing
the test for incitement.' 5'
In Brandenburg, the defendant, a leader of an Ohio Ku Klux
Klan group, was convicted of violating Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism
Statute. This statute forbade the advocation of crime or violence as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform. 15 2 In a unani-
mous per curiam opinion, the Court struck down the Ohio statute
without considering whether the defendant's particular speech could
have been proscribed. 53 In doing so, the Court articulated new re-
quirements for limiting speech that advocates the use of force or
crime. 1 4 First, the advocacy must be "directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action"; 15  and second, the advocacy must be
"likely to incite or produce such action."'' 56
As it relates to preventing racist speech, the Brandenburg clear
and present danger test suffers from several shortcomings. First, it
only protects against imminent physical violence, not psychological
injury. 57 Second, the Brandenburg test "targets only the trigger of
violence instead of all the events that may have contributed to height-
ened racial tension."' l5 8 This is a problem because, although immedi-
ate danger is not always present, every racial insult and epithet
exacerbates racial tensions. 59 Third, physical violence is often un-
likely where the target of the racist speech is a minority, thereby mak-
ing the second half of the Brandenburg test often impossible to
148. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
149. Id. at 52.
150. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiamn).
151. Id. at 447.
152. Id. at 444-45.
153. Id. at 449.
154. Id. at 447.
155. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
156. Id.
157. Schwartz, supra note 93, at 759.
158. Id. at 764.
159. Id.
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meet. 60 This occurs because, rather than reacting with violence,
many minority victims of racist speech attempt to avoid racist en-
counters and instead internalize the harm.16' By doing this, "self-de-
fensive withdrawal erects a constitutional wall that isolates minorities
from state protection."' 162 These reasons show that the clear and pres-
ent danger test is not a satisfactory response to the problems created
by racist blue humor.
c. Fighting Words
The "fighting words doctrine" originated in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 63 a case in which the defendant called the city marshall a
"God damned racketeer" and "a damned fascist."' 64 In doing so,
Chaplinsky violated a statute providing that "[n]o person shall ad-
dress any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person
who is lawfully in any street or other public place."' 65 The Supreme
Court unanimously upheld Chaplinsky's conviction under the state
statute, noting that
such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social inter-
est in order and morality. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is
not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion
safeguarded by the Constitution."' 66
Thus, the Court held that the First Amendment does not protect
fighting words, defined as words that "by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."' 67 This
test, unlike the others, recognizes that words, like conduct, can cause
injury.
There is no question that racial insults inflict injury by their very
utterance: "Words such as 'nigger' and 'spick' are badges of degrada-
160. Id. at 765 (citing Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2337).
161. Id. Although not necessarily true for all minority victims, the withdrawal syndrome
is definitely true for some. To avoid racist attacks, victims have quit jobs, interrupted their
educations, left their homes, avoided certain public places, curtailed their own speech rights,
and have otherwise modified their behavior and demeanor. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2337.
For specific examples of such withdrawal from society, see supra note 73.
162. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2337.
163. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
164. Id. at 569.
165. Id.




tion even when used between friends; these words have no other con-
notation." 168 Thus, initially it would appear that racist speech falls
within the fighting words exception. Unfortunately, the first part of
the fighting words definition, prohibiting words that "by their very
utterance inflict injury," was merely dicta. 69 Chaplinsky's actual
holding was limited to justifying the state statute as reflective of the
state's interest in preserving the peace by prohibiting "words likely to
cause an average addressee to fight."' 170 This is supported by the fact
that the Supreme Court, in Gooding v. Wilson, 171 narrowed the
Chaplinsky fighting words definition by ignoring the earlier dicta and
limiting the definition of fighting words to include only those words
that "tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."' 72
Despite the Gooding limitation, Professor Laurence Tribe has
noted that the Supreme Court "has not foreclosed the possibility of
imposing costs on those whose words inflict injury by their very utter-
ance [and that t]he Constitution may well allow punishment for
speaking words that cause hurt just by their being uttered and
heard."' 73 Thus, although Professor Tribe believes that the Seventh
Circuit appropriately rejected a Skokie, Illinois village ordinance that
prohibited a planned neo-Nazi march, 74 he nonetheless concludes
that a more narrowly drawn statute might have passed constitutional
muster. 75
As the law now stands, however, fighting words are limited to
those that "tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."' 76
Therefore, while the harm that results from racial insults can be anal-
ogized to a breach of the peace, whether it be severe emotional dis-
tress or the feeling of social inequality,' 77 it appears that the fighting
168. Delgado, supra note 51, at 173-74.
169. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
170. Id. at 573.
171. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
172. See id. at 532.
173. TRIBE, supra note 123, § 12-10, at 856.
174. See Colin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
175. TRIBE, supra note 123, § 12-10, at 856.
176. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 523.
177. J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEo. L.J.
399, 407 (1991) (citing Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets, Are They Protected Speech?, 42
RUTGERS L. REV. 287 (1990)). However, the common law does not permit tort recovery for
racial insults without proof of aggravating circumstances. See Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores,
499 A.2d 648, 650 (Pa. 1985).
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words exception applies only to physical breaches of the peace. 178 As
such, racial insults may still constitute fighting words if they are
targeted at a victim who is able and inclined to answer with vio-
lence. 179 The problem, however, is that minority victims of racist
speech generally are unlikely to respond with violence. 8 0 In addition,
some commentators argue that racist speech should never be consid-
ered part of the fighting words exception to freedom of expression
because racist speech is so common that people are generally expected
to tolerate it. 181
In any event, it appears that racist speech does not fit comforta-
bly into the group libel, incitement, or fighting words categories.
However, that is not the end of the analysis, as the theories of free
speech must also be considered.
2. Theories of Free Speech
The Supreme Court, in deciding whether content-based regula-
tions withstand First Amendment scrutiny, next considers "the extent
to which the speech furthers the historical, political, and philosophi-
cal purposes that underlie the [F]irst [A]mendment."182 Therefore,
assessing the validity of regulating racist police humor requires an ex-
amination of such speech to determine whether it furthers the search
for truth, self-government, or self-fulfillment.
a. Truth
According to one theory, free speech is essential to the pursuit of
truth because "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
178. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
179. Byrne, supra note 177, at 406-07.
180. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
181. See Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2344; see also Howard v. National Cash Register Co.,
388 F. Supp. 603, 606 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (noting that "[a]gainst a large part of the frictions and
irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation in a community life, a cer-
tain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law ever could be") (quoting
Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1033, 1061 (1936)).
182. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189, 194 (1983). For example, the Supreme Court in Beauharnais stated that
[i]t has been well observed that such utterances [i.e., lewd, obscene, profane, libelous,
insulting, or fighting words] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Beauharnais, 250 U.S. at 256-57.
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itself accepted in the competition of the marketplace."18 3 Because no
one is infallible, no one is qualified to decide what is a true opinion. i84
In light of this, the Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,Is5
held that "there is no such thing as a false idea."186 Rather,
when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or
many times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found
persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on
a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution
until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts
to suppress it.
18 7
However, the likelihood of some views being true is so minute
that, "even grant[ing] human fallibility, the risk of suppressing truth
cannot be a serious reason for disallowing their suppression."'' 88 In-
deed, racism is one of those ideas that has been collectively rejected by
the international community. 8 9 Even adamant supporters of absolute
free speech avoid claiming possible truth as a basis for protecting ra-
cial insults, arguing instead that racist speech must be protected in
order to ensure free speech for all. Is0
In addition, racial slurs do not contribute to the discovery of
truth.191 Such insults are different from classroom discussions of race
because academic discussions and informal criticisms invite response,
thus furthering the search for truth. 192 In contrast, racial insults in-
vite no thoughtful response and therefore do not further the search
for truth. Rather, such comments "are like a slap in the face."
193
"Racial insults ... do not attempt to establish, improve, or criticize
183. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See gen-
erally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (D. Spitz ed., 1975) (1859) (arguing that free speech
is essential to the pursuit of truth).
184. MILL, supra note 183, at 18 ("All silencing of discussion is an assumption of
infallibility.").
185. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
186. Id. at 339.
187. MILL, supra note 183, at 29.
188. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 471.
189. See infra notes 291-375 and accompanying text.
190. See generally ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY (1979); LEE C. BOLLINGER,
THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA
(1986).
191. Delgado, supra note 60, at 379; see also KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND
THE USES OF LANGUAGE 297-99 (1989); Schwartz, supra note 93, at 740 (arguing that racist
speech "does not contribute to an understanding of our society any more than the argument
that the world is flat").
192. Schwartz, supra note 93, at 742.
193. Delgado, supra note 60, at 379; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 191, at 289-99.
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any proposition or object of inquiry.... Racial insults communicate
only scorn or hatred irrationally based on immutable characteristics
of the target. Their goal can only be to diminish the victim ....
Victims of racial insults rarely utilize additional speech as a solution
to the attacks, because the insults "strike suddenly, immobilizing their
victim[s] and rendering [them] speechless." 195 Thus, the pursuit of
truth may actually be impeded rather than advanced by the expres-
sion of racist speech. 196
b. Democracy
The democratic concept holds that the right to freedom of ex-
pression is necessary to ensure a free flow of ideas and information
among the people. 197 Democracy itself means that the government's
authority is derived "from the consent of the governed."' 198 All mem-
bers of the community must be given an equal opportunity to partici-
pate in decision-making through the open discussion of ideas. 199 The
key to democracy is "that all persons participate. ' ' 200
Conversations about race that encourage a thoughtful response
do not infringe on the participatory rights of others, and therefore
contribute to the concept of self-government. 201 The notion of equal
participation, however, is not furthered by speech that encourages ra-
cial inferiority and exclusion. 202 Rather, the principle of democracy is
undermined when some voices are permitted to silence others through
intimidation.20 3
In addition, attempts by racial minorities to participate in the
democratic process often meet with hostility.20 4 For example, in
194. Byrne, supra note 177, at 419.
195. Delgado, supra note 60, at 379. Also, "talking back" to a person who has just hurled
a racial slur at a minority victim is usually not feasible. Id. at 379 n.3 11. Nothing has quite
the same emotional impact as a racial epithet such as, "Go home, Nigger, you don't belong
here." As stated by Professor Richard Delgado, "What word has the impact of Nigger-you
white?" Id. (emphasis in original).
196. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 476.
197. Id. at 476. For the classic presentation of the democracy argument, see ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
198. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 883 (1963).
199. Id. at 882.
200. Id.
201. Schwartz, supra note 93, at 745.
202. Id. at 743-44.
203. Id. at 746.
204. Id. at 745.
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1988, black students at the University of California at Berkeley re-
quested that the school radio station play rap music. 205 A student
disc jockey responded over the air by telling the students to "[glo
back to Oakland, ' 20 6 a predominantly black community located be-
tween San Francisco and Berkeley. 20 7 According to one writer, that
racial insult sent "a message to all black students that if they attempt
to have a voice in campus organization, they will be treated with
hostility."'208
Excluding citizens from participating in society on the basis of
their race results in inequality. 20 9 Racial epithets promote alienation
and inequality by excluding members of certain racial groups. The
result contradicts the self-government justification for free expression
in a participatory democracy. 21 0
c. Individual Fulfillment
The theory of self-fulfillment as a justification for free expression
begins with individual realization of character and potential. 21' To
achieve self-fulfillment, all individuals must have the right to form
and express their beliefs and opinions, "[flor expression is an integral
part of the development of ideas of mental exploration and of the affir-
mation of self."' 212 Limiting a person's right to expression subjects
that individual to the arbitrary control of society. 213
Uttering racial slurs, however, "hardly seems essential to self-
fulfillment in any ideal sense. ' 21 4 To the contrary, racial insults stifle
the moral and social growth of the speaker by reinforcing myopic
thinking. 215 Furthermore, a person's search for self-realization may
205. For a general overview of this event, see id. at 745 & n.52. "Rap music" is a popular
form of music associated with black culture. See Patrick Goldstein, Pop Eye: A Rappin' Big
Year for Little Jive Records, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 1988, at 90; Robert Hillburn, Rap-The
Power and the Controversy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1990, at 78.
206. See Schwartz, supra note 94, at 745 & n.53.
207. THE WORLD ALMANAC 1991, at 558 (1991) (racial composition based on 1980 cen-
sus figures).
208. Schwartz, supra note 93, at 745.
209. Id. at 744.
210. Id.
211. Emerson, supra note 198, at 879.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 880.
214. Delgado, supra note 60, at 379.
215. See Delgado, supra note 51, at 140, 176; see also ALLPORT, supra note 60, at 170-86,
371-84.
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be curtailed when it harms another. 216 In this regard, "[t]he idea that
my liberty to swing my arm ends where the next person's nose begins
applies to freedom of speech, as well as to freedom of movement. '21 7
Since racial insults, like blue humor, injure their victims mentally,
psychologically, and even physically, 218 they should not be allowed to
stand as an avenue for self-fulfillment.
3. The Dangers of Suppression
Although racist speech does not further the search for truth, self-
government, or self-fulfillment, dangers exist in attempting to regulate
it. These dangers, including possible administrative abuse, defini-
tional, and other problems, must be examined to establish whether the
hazards in regulating racist speech outweigh the benefits.
a The Possibility of Administrative Abuse
Administrative abuse could occur when legal restrictions on
speech transform states into censors with no way to ensure that
"good" speech will not be condemned along with "bad" speech.219
States would be in a position to silence speech whenever they dis-
agreed with its content.220 In this respect, it has been said that "[o]ur
insistence on free speech stems not so much from optimism about the
emergence of truth from open debate as from realistic pessimism
about the character of representative government. ' 221
Also problematic is the possibility that members of minority
groups could themselves become the unintended targets of the regula-
216. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 454.
217. Id. For example, "although one may dress in Nazi uniforms and demonstrate before
the city hall in Skokie, Illinois, one may not paint swastikas on one's neighbor's doors." Del-
gado, supra note 51, at 176 (referring to Colin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 916 (1978)); see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (holding that while student
groups cannot be punished for their philosophies, they can be punished for acting on those
philosophies in a way that infringes upon the rights of others).
218. See supra notes 66-117 and accompanying text.
219. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2351.
220. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 490; Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2351. As stated by
Professor Nadine Strossen,
Once we acknowledge the subtle discretion that anti-hate speech rules will vest in
those who enforce them, then we are ceding to the government the power to pick and
choose whose words to protect and whose to punish. Such discretionary governmen-
tal power is fundamentally antithetical to the free speech guarantee. Once the gov-
ernment is allowed to punish any speech based upon its content, free expression
exists only for those with power.
Strossen, supra note 139, at 539.
221. Byrne, supra note 177, at 404.
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tions.222 For example, an African-American speaker sponsored by
the African-American student organization, Black Power Serves It-
self, was the first person charged under Trinity College's new policy
prohibiting racial harassment.223 Likewise, during the year in which
the University of Michigan enforced its anti-hate speech rule,224 more
than twenty complaints were filed against African-Americans, charg-
ing them with racist speech. 225 The only student subjected to a full
disciplinary hearing was an African-American student accused of
homophobic and sexist expression. 226 Others punished under the
University of Michigan rule included a group of Jewish students ac-
cused of making anti-Semitic expressions 227 and an Asian-American
student accused of making an anti-African-American comment.228
Similarly, at the University of Connecticut, an Asian-American was
penalized under the university's hate speech policy for an allegedly
homophobic remark.229
However, the potential for abuse alone should not excuse the
LAPD's responsibility to prohibit the use of racist speech by its police
officers. As stated by the Supreme Court in Beauharnais, "Every
power may be abused, but the possibility of potential abuse is a poor
222. Strossen, supra note 139, at 512 ("[The] record substantiates the risk that... speech
restriction[s] will be applied discriminatorily and disproportionately against the very minority
group members whom it is intended to protect."); Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free
Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 566 (1980) (stating that one very real danger is "that the penal
law will be selectively invoked against members of racial or other minority groups and speak-
ers who espouse ideological views unpopular with enforcement officials"); Kenneth L. Karst,
Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cli. L. REv. 20, 38 (1975)
("[S]tatutes... proscribing abusive words are applied to members of racial and political mi-
norities more frequently than can be wholly explained by any special proclivity of those people
to speak abusively.").
223. Black Talks Prompt Protest and Complaint, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1989, § 1, at 67.
224. See generally Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
225. See Stephen F. Rohde, Campus Speech Codes: Politically Correct, Constitutionally
Wrong, L.A. LAW., Dec. 1991, at 24. The only two instances where sanctions were imposed
involved speech by or on behalf of African-American students. Strossen, supra note 139, at
557 (citing Plaintiff's Exhibit Submitted in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1,
University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 852).
226. Strossen, supra note 139, at 557.
227. Id. at 558. The students wrote graffiti, including a swastika, on a classroom black-
board, asserting later that it was done as a practical joke. Id.
228. Id. After being punished for questioning why African-Americans perceive them-
selves as the target of discrimination, the student explained that the African-American stu-
dents in his dormitory tended to socialize together, leaving him socially isolated. Id.
229. Id. In a suit challenging the University of Connecticut's anti-hate speech policy, the
Asian-American student claimed that although other students had engaged in similar expres-
sions, she was singled out because of her race. Id. (citing Wu v. University of Conn., No. Civ.
H89-649 PCD (D. Conn. 1989)).
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reason for denying [a state] the power to adopt measures against crim-
inal libels .... ,,230 In addition, although there are no foolproof meth-
ods of avoiding selective enforcement, abuse of these rules can be
restricted by taking certain legal precautions. For example, enforce-
ment powers can be vested in the state Attorney General,231 rather
than in the LAPD itself. In this capacity, the Attorney General can
act as "a nonpolitical appointee who has attained almost quasi-judi-
cial status and has built a tradition of prosecuting decisions free of
political considerations and pressures from the executive branch. '232
Thus, the Attorney General is likely to be more sensitive to both free
speech issues and the rights of victims of racist speech.
b. Definitional Problems
Concomitant with the problem of censorship lies the problem of
defining which groups deserve protection. The issue is whether racial
and ethnic groups alone deserve protection, or whether religion, wo-
men, homosexuals, and disabled people should also be included
within the protected circle.233 Selecting among deserving groups may
subject protection to political whim. 234
In addition, there remains the problem of classifying and defining
racially-based speech in a way that avoids treading on constitution-
ally-protected speech.235 For example, should the definition of insult-
ing speech include only speech that employs derogatory terms, or
should it include speech that articulates insulting ideas as well?
236
Also, should statistics indicating that some ethnic groups have a
higher crime rate than others constitute insulting speech?237
Although a broad definition of prohibited speech may include all ra-
cist speech, it may also encompass speech not intended to be re-
stricted.23a On the other hand, a narrow definition may leave a whole
230. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 (1951). See supra notes 132-44 for a dis-
cussion of the Beauharnais case.
231. Vesting the power of enforcement in the Attorney General would be consistent with
the racist speech laws of other countries, such as Great Britain and Canada. For a more
detailed discussion of these laws, see infra notes 330-47 and accompanying text.
232. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 491.
233. Strossen, supra note 139, at 537-38.
234. Byrne, supra note 177, at 412.
235. Strossen, supra note 139, at 538.
236. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 488-89.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 488.
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host of racist speech unrestricted. 239
The overbreadth problem inherent in prohibiting certain speech
stems largely from attempts to regulate all racist speech. However,
regulating only racist blue humor avoids the problem of overbreadth
because it specifically addresses racial insults by police officers. While
such a narrow application will leave most racist speech unprohibited,
the purposes of anti-hate speech laws-protecting the dignity of indi-
viduals, preventing breaches of the peace, and maintaining a symbolic




Another problem with suppression is that the prohibition of ra-
cist speech is unlikely to eliminate racism itself.24' According to this
theory, since racist speech is only a symptom of racism, banning the
symptom presumably will not eliminate the larger problem.242 In
fact, there is no direct evidence persuasively demonstrating that pun-
ishment changes deeply held attitudes. 243 To the contrary, punish-
ment may render racist speech an attractive tool for racists seeking
martyrdom, self-glorification, and publicity. 2 "
With respect to racist blue humor, however, prosecution for en-
gaging in racist speech is unlikely to glorify a police officer. Indeed,
citizens were so shocked at the racist MDT transmissions disclosed
following the Rodney King beating that Mayor Tom Bradley created
the Commission to address both the use of excessive force by officers
and racism in the LAPD.245 More importantly, however, prohibiting
racist blue humor will serve to shield the victims from both the verbal
and the physical violence inflicted upon them by the officers charged
with protecting them.246
As can be seen, racist speech does not further the search for
truth, self-government, or individual fulfillment. In addition, the ben-
efits of suppressing racist police humor outweigh the possible dangers.
239. Id.
240. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 489.
241. Rohde, supra note 225, at 24. For a contrasting view, see supra notes 56-65 and
accompanying text.
242. Strossen, supra note 139, at 554.
243. Id. at 554-55.
244. Id. at 554-55, 559.
245. See supra notes 8-32 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 66-117 and accompanying text.
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Even more compelling, however, is that the Supreme Court has held
that public sector employees do not enjoy an absolute right to the
First Amendment guarantee of free expression. 247
4. The Government Employee Exception to the First Amendment
In Connick v. Myers,248 Sheila Myers, an assistant district attor-
ney in New Orleans, Louisiana, objected to her pending transfer to
another section of the criminal court, and criticized certain intra-of-
fice policies. 249 When informed by superiors that others in the office
did not share her views, Myers distributed a questionnaire to her fel-
low employees to determine if this was in fact the case.250 The distri-
bution of the questionnaire resulted in Myers' termination for both
refusing to accept the transfer and for "insubordination. ' 251 In up-
holding the termination, the Court held that a public employee's
speech is not covered by the First Amendment unless it embraces a
247. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (holding that government officials
can fire employees with impunity for speech that is not "a matter of public concern").
248. See id.
249. Id. at 140-41.
250. Id. at 141. The questionnaire asked the following:
1. How long have you been in the Office?
2. Were you moved as a result of the recent transfers?
3. Were the transfers as they effected [sic] you discussed with you by any
superior prior to the notice of them being posted?
4. Do you think as a matter of policy, they should have been?
5. From your experience, do you feel office procedure regarding transfers has
been fair?
6. Do you believe there is a rumor mill active in the office?
7. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] overall working performance of A.D.A.
personnel?
8. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] office morale?
9. Do you generally first learn of office changes and developments through
rumor?






11. Do you ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office
supported candidates?
12. Do you feel a grievance committee would be a worthwhile addition to the
office structure?.
13. How would you rate office morale?
14. Please feel free to express any comments or feelings you have.
Id. at 155-56.
251. Id. at 141.
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matter of public concern and does not disrupt the workplace.
252
Therefore, even if employee speech involves matters of public con-
cern, and even if the state cannot show that the speech actually im-
pedes office operations, the state can nonetheless punish an employee
when it believes that the speech may undermine workplace discipline,
morale, or efficiency. 253 It is not necessary for the state to wait "to
allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office
and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking
action."
254
Police officers, as public employees, do not have a First Amend-
ment right to engage in racist speech unless it embraces a matter of
public concern, an improbable event. In defining "public concern,"
the Ninth Circuit has stated that
[s]peech by public employees may be characterized as not of "pub-
lic concern" when it is clear that such speech deals with individual
... disputes and grievances and that the information would be of
no relevance to the public's evaluation of their performance of gov-
ernmental agencies .... On the other hand, speech that concerns
"issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable
the members of society" to make informed decisions about the op-
eration of their government merits the highest degree of [F]irst
[A]mendment protection.255
Matters of public concern are determined by the "content, form, and
context" of the speech.256
The content, form, and context of racist blue humor are racial
inferiority, racial insult, and racism by a government agency, respec-
tively. If Myers' questionnaire only "touched upon matters of public
concern in . . . a most limited sense, ' 257 then police officers' racial
insults do not even approach touching matters of public concern. 258
Even if racial insults do involve a matter of public concern, they un-
questionably undermine the workplace discipline and morale of mi-
nority officers, and therefore may be regulated. 259 A government
employer must be given "wide discretion and control over the man-
252. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140, 147.
253. Id. at 151-52.
254. Id. at 152.
255. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983).
256. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
257. Id. at 154.
258. See Joyner v. Lancaster, 815 F.2d 20, 23 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987).
259. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52; see also supra notes 25-26, 80-90 and accompanying
text.
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agement of its personnel and internal affairs," 26 including the ability
to discipline or even remove an unruly officer if necessary. 261 In this
regard,
courts must give weight to the nature of the employee's job in as-
sessing the possible effect of his action on employee morale, disci-
pline or efficiency. In doing so, it must be recognized that such
effect may vary with the job occupied by the employee. In analyz-
ing the weight to be given a particular job in this connection non-
policymaking employees can be arrayed on a spectrum, from uni-
versity professors at one end to policemen at the other. State inhi-
bition of academic freedom is strongly disfavored. . . . In polar
contrast is the discipline demanded of, and freedom correspondingly
denied to [,] policemen.262
Thus, due in part to the paramilitary nature of police forces,
263
courts have held that a police department's interests in discipline, es-
prit de corps, and uniformity outweigh an individual officer's interest
in making disrespectful and disparaging remarks. 264 It is clear, there-
fore, that police officers do not have a First Amendment right to en-
gage in disrespectful and disparaging racist blue humor. The next
question is whether the Fourteenth Amendment mandates the prohi-
bition of racist police humor.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, "No
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."' 265 Inherent in this clause is the principle of
equal citizenship, 266 that "every individual is presumptively entitled
to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and
participating member. ' 267 Because speech supporting racial prejudice
260. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
261. Id.
262. Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868, 880 (4th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
263. Gasparenetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 321 (2d Cir. 1977) (Rosenn, J., dissenting in
part), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903 (1978).
264. See, e.g., Kannisto v. City and County of San Francisco, 541 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977).
265. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
266. Kenneth Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1
(1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 438-39.
267. Karst, supra note 266, at 1.
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treats citizens unequally, it contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment's
principle of equal protection.268
1. Racist Speech Versus Equality
Racist speech encroaches upon the Fourteenth Amendment prin-
ciple of equal protection because it contains a message of inferi-
ority.269 In fact, "[v]iolent expressions of bigotry are particularly
damaging to the preservation of equality, because they focus on super-
ficial characteristics which victims are powerless to change and which
do not relate to individual accomplishments or other common criteria
of self-worth.
'270
Professor Charles Lawrence has argued that the landmark case
of Brown v. Board of Education271 supports the regulation of racist
speech. 272 According to Professor Lawrence, when the Supreme
Court in Brown held that segregation is inherently unconstitutional, it
did so primarily because segregation conveys a message of inferi-
ority. 273 By holding segregation to be unconstitutional, the Court
necessarily intended to erase the message of inferiority contained in
the practice of segregation.274 Although Professor Lawrence notes a
distinction between discriminatory conduct and speech, he neverthe-
less maintains there is no purpose for outlawing segregation that is
unrelated to speech.275 Professor Lawrence concludes that Brown in-
vokes the Fourteenth Amendment and prohibits states from engaging
in racist speech and denying citizens equal protection. 276 In fact, the
268. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 456.
269. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 267, 272 (1991); Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2357. But see Justice Brennan's
observation in United States v. Eichmann, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), that "virulent ethnic and reli-
gious epithets" ought to receive constitutional protection because of the "bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment... that the Government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Id. at 319 (quot-
ing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
270. HOGAN & HARTSON, STRIKING BACK AT BIGOTRY: REMEDIES UNDER FEDERAL
AND STATE LAW FOR VIOLENCE MOTIVATED BY RACIAL, RELIGIOUS, AND ETHNIC PREJU-
DICE 2 (Supp. 1988).
271. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregated schools are inherently unequal).
272. See generally Lawrence, supra note 266.
273. Id. at 439.
274. Id. at 439-40.
275. Id. at 440; see also TRIBE, supra note 123, § 12-7, at 827 ("[A]ny particular course of
conduct may be hung almost randomly on the 'speech' peg or the 'conduct' peg as one sees
fit.").
276. Lawrence III, supra note 266, at 440 n.41. On its face, the Fourteenth Amendment
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Fourteenth Amendment requires the suppression of racist speech by
government employees, including police officers.
2. Racist Speech and Government Employees
The post-Civil War amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion 277 charge the government with the power and obligation to eradi-
cate all "badges and incidents of slavery," including racial
discrimination. 278 By its very terms, the Fourteenth Amendment pre-
cludes state governments from denying any person the equal protec-
tion of the laws. 279 This absolute obligation "to counter racism
clearly is incompatible with racist speech tolerated by the government
itself."2 8 0
Accordingly, the law has recognized that the use of racist lan-
guage by government officials is intolerable. 281 Courts and adminis-
trative bodies have required prison officials, 282 judges, 283 and police
applies only to states or state actors, and not to private citizens. In general, this "state action
doctrine" provides that
although someone may have suffered harmful treatment of a kind that one might
ordinarily describe as a deprivation of liberty or a denial of equal protection of the
laws, that occurrence excites no constitutional concern unless the proximate active
perpetrators of the harm include persons exercising the special authority or power of
the government of a state.
Frank Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case
of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 306 (1989). However, Professor Lawrence
extends his analysis of Brown to prohibit racist speech by private individual citizens as well as
by the state. Lawrence, supra note 266, at 444. Although he acknowledges the private/public
distinction, Professor Lawrence argues that "reliance on the state action doctrine in this con-
text avoids the real issue." Id. at 440 n.41. This part of Professor Lawrence's analysis is
inapposite to the argument presented in this Comment, which argues for the restriction of
racial insults by police officers, who are government employees.
277. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
278. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1888).
279. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
280. Strossen, supra note 139, at 544.
281. See City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 239 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn. 1976) ("The use
of the term 'nigger' has no place in the civil treatment of a citizen by a public official."). The
international arena concurs that racist language by public officials is impermissible. See Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 4(c), G.A.
Res. 2106A(XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965)
[hereinafter Convention] (State Parties "[s]hall not permit public authorities or public institu-
tions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination."). For a discussion of inter-
national treatment of racist speech, see infra notes 291-375 and accompanying text.
282. Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194, 205, 214 (E.D. Ark. 1973), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom., Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
283. Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330, 337 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938 (1980)
(holding that a Caucasian judge's racially motivated campaign to discredit an African-Ameri-
can police officer and seek his termination, including calling the officer a "black bastard," was
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officers284 to avoid racial language. For example, in City of Minneapo-
lis v. Richardson,285 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
[w]e cannot regard use of the term "nigger" in reference to a black
youth as anything but discrimination against that youth based on
his race .... When a racial epithet is used to refer to a [black]
person . . . an adverse distinction is implied between that person
and other persons not of his race. The use of the term "nigger" has
no place in the civil treatment of a citizen by a public official. We
hold that use of this term by police officers coupled with all of the
other uncontradicted acts described herein constituted discrimina-
tion because of race. 2
86
Some states have even enacted anti-discrimination statutes that pro-
hibit police officers from engaging in racial insults.287
Moreover, as a government agency, a police department, such as
the LAPD, has a duty to restrict such racist speech. Failure to do so
may constitute state action under the Constitution.28 8 The Supreme
Court has held that state action occurs when a state significantly en-
courages private discrimination 289 or delegates authority to private
parties to make discriminatory decisions. 290 By failing to enforce its
policy against racial insults, the LAPD has encouraged and author-
ized individual officers to engage in racist blue humor. Thus, the
"such an intentional tort inspired by racial animus and perpetrated under color of state law
[that it] constitute[d] a denial of equal protection"); see also In re Stevens, 645 P.2d 99 (Cal.
1982) (holding that a judge's use of the racial terms "jig," "dark boy," "colored boy," "nig-
ger," "coon," "Amos and Andy," and "jungle bunny," in reference to African-Americans, and
"cute little tamale," "spick," and "bean," in reference to Hispanics, constituted conduct "prej-
udicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute").
284. Allen v. City of Mobile, 331 F. Supp. 1134, 1150 (S.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d
122 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973).
285. 239 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1976).
286. Id. at 203. In Richardson, a crowd of people observed the police making an arrest.
The police used dogs to disperse the crowd. One of the dogs bit the hand of a man standing
next to an African-American youth. When the dog leapt at the youth, he struck it down with
a rolled-up poster. The youth was arrested, dragged face down to the police car, and called a
"nigger" by the police. Id.
287. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis v. State, 310 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. 1981) (holding
that a Minnesota anti-discrimination statute prohibits police officers from calling a Caucasian
person a "nigger lover").
288. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9-10; see also TRIBE, supra note 123, § 18-2, at
1693. For a definition of "state action," see supra note 276.
289. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (finding state action in the judicial enforcement
of racially discriminatory restrictive covenants).
290. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (finding state action where a state author-
ized private individuals to discriminate in the sale or lease of real property by amending the
state constitution to prohibit government interference).
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LAPD has violated the principles of equal protection contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment by not effectively enforcing its ban on racial
insults.
IV. INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION
The proper measure by which any personal liberty must be gauged,
particularly freedom of speech, is the degree to which it allows an
individual to impose his speech on someone else, and the deleteri-
ous effect his actions might have on others. If either is excessive,
the liberty must be restricted. The effect of racial defamation is
demonstrably deleterious to all persons within the scope of its con-
tempt. It lacks constitutional value; its imposition is the verbal
counterpart of a body blow to all persons swept within the scope of
its contempt, as well as to the social fabric of American democ-
racy. The ultimate liberty, after all, is not freedom of speech, but
the right to live in peace, secure from harassment.
29'
In recognition of this principle, the international arena has offi-
cially condemned racist speech. 292 When the Allies uncovered the
atrocities of World War II's Nazi regime, fighting racism became a
top priority shadowing even the importance of free speech. 293
Shocked by the revelation of the inhumane genocide practices of the
Third Reich, "nations agreed on the necessity of establishing general
standards for the respect of persons and minorities. ' ' 294 Resulting in-
ternational condemnation of discrimination and racial violence ap-
pears in both multilateral instruments 295 and individual domestic
291. Kenneth Lasson, Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment,
17 COLUM. HUM. RiS. L. REV. 11, 53 (1985).
292. See, e.g., Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, 1975 AUsTL. Acts P. 349; Canadian
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 319(l)-319(3) (1985), amended by ch. C-42, § 319(2)
(1988); Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, §§ 17-18 (Gr. Brit.); Race Relations Act of 1971, no.
150, 4 N.Z. Stat. 3590 (amended 1977); Convention, supra note 281, art. 4; International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Covenant]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
art. 7, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 73 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
293. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 447.
294. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, HATE PROPAGANDA 6 (Working Paper
No. 50, 1986).
295. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 281, art. 4 (State Parties are required to "declare an
offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred"
while giving "due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights [including free speech]"); Covenant, supra note 292, arts. 19, 20 (while article 19 of the
Covenant guarantees the right to freedom of expression, article 20 provides, "Any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law"); Universal Declaration, supra note 292, art. 7 ("All are
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legislation. 296
A. International Instruments
The most important and specific piece of multilateral antiracism
legislation is the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination ("Convention"). 297 The Convention,
with 128 signatories as of 1989,298 condemns and criminalizes racist
speech while recognizing a free speech right.299
Article 4 of the Convention requires member states to adopt im-
mediate and positive measures to eradicate all incitement to racism.3°°
These measures require criminalizing all dissemination of materials
premised on racial superiority or racial hatred.30 Significantly, arti-
cle 4(c) mandates the prohibition of all racist speech by public author-
ities, which includes police officers. 30 2 At the same time, however,
article 4 implicitly recognizes the right to free speech by requiring
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and
against any incitement to such discrimination.").
296. See, e.g., Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, 1975 AUSTL. AcTS P. 349; Canadian
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 319(l)-319(3) (1985), amended by ch. C-42, § 319(2)
(1988); Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, §§ 17-18 (Gr. Brit.); Race Relations Act of 1971, no.
150, 4 N.Z. Stat. 3590 (amended 1977).
297. Convention, supra note 281.
298. U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS-STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS, 1987, at 12, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/5, U.N. Sales No. E.87.XIV.2 (Sept. 1, 1989).
299. Convention, supra note 281, art. 4.
300. Id. Article 4 provides,
State Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on
ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic
origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any
form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate
all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to
the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of
violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another
colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities,
including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination and shall rec-
ognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by
law; [and]
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to
promote or incite racial discrimination.
Id.
301. Id. art. 4(a) (States "[s]hall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, (or] incitement to racial discrimination ... .
302. Id. art. 4(c).
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states to give "due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in
article 5 of this Convention, ' 3 03 including freedom of speech, associa-
tion, and conscience.3 °4 Nonetheless, the Convention espouses the
principle that freedom from racist hate speech is a right deserving
greater protection than the right to engage in such speech.
305
The conflict between freedom of speech and freedom from racist
hate speech created considerable discord when delegates debated the
adoption of article 4 as part of the final version of the Convention.
3 6
The United States argued in favor of banning the direct incitement to
acts of racial violence section.30 7 The United States also sought to
explicitly include free speech rights within the text of the Conven-
tion.308 The final decision30 9 rejected the United States' view and
adopted article 4 as it now reads, banning acts of violence and the
dissemination of racist ideas, while giving due regard to freedom of
speech.310
As stated by one author, "[t]he survival of article 4, in spite of
the controversy, indicates the overriding strength of the basic idea
that promotion of racism is a serious threat to the protection of
human rights. ' 311 Notably, all countries, including the United States,
agreed on the basic goal of eliminating racism and were unwilling to
abandon the effort notwithstanding the problems surrounding the free
speech issue.3
12
Unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on December
21, 1965, 313 the Convention became effective on January 4, 1969.314
Although some democratic countries have retained reservations re-
garding article 4,315 most have ratified the Convention and enacted
303. Id. art. 4; see also Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2341.
304. Convention, supra note 281, arts. 4, 5.
305. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2341-42.
306. See generally id. at 2344.
307. NATAN LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 44 (2d ed. 1980). This view is consistent with United States case
law. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
308. LERNER, supra note 307, at 46.
309. The vote was 16 in favor and 5 abstaining. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2343.
310. See LERNER, supra note 307, at 45.
311. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2344-45.
312. Id.
313. U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1406th mtg., at 7, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1406 (1965).
314. U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 298, at 97.
315. For example, Belgium stated that article 4 obligations "must be reconciled with the
right to freedom of opinion and expression." LERNER, supra note 307, at 156-62. Similarly,
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legislation limiting racist speech.316 The one major exception is the
United States. 317 Despite being an early signatory to the Conven-
tion,318 and despite its free speech reservation,3 19 the United States has
not yet ratified the Convention. 320 The reservation and failure to rat-
ify the Convention illustrate the United States' extreme commitment
to First Amendment principles at the expense of anti-discrimination
goals, and separates the United States from the international
community. 3
21
Other international human rights documents also recognize the
necessity of limiting racist hate messages. Both the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights 322 and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights 323 protect against discrimination based on na-
France interpreted article 4 as "releasing the States Parties from the obligation to enact anti-
discriminatory legislation which is incompatible with freedom of opinion and expression and
of peaceful assembly and association." Id. at 158. Italy likewise declared that the measures
adopted under article 4 must not "jeopardize the right to freedom of opinion and expression."
Id. at 159.
316. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 448-49 & n.17; Delgado, supra note 60, at 363.
317. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 448-49.
318. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg signed the Convention for the United States on Sep-
tember 28, 1966. Peter W. Schroth & Virginia S. Mueller, Racial Discrimination: The United
States and the International Convention, 4 HUMAN RTs. 171, 177 (1975).
319. The reservation reads as follows:
The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the protection of indi-
vidual rights, such as the right of free speech, and nothing in the Convention shall be
deemed to require or to authorize legislation or other action by the United States of
America incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of
America.
55 DEP'T ST. BULL. 653 (1966).
320. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2345; Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 450; Delgado, supra
note 60, at 363 n.158.
321. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2346.
322. Universal Declaration, supra note 292, at 71. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights provides, in part: "All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimina-
tion to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimina-
tion in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination." Id.
(emphasis added).
323. Covenant, supra note 292. Although the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was
signed by the United States on October 5, 1977, it has not been ratified. U.N. CENTRE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 298, at 12. When submitting the Covenant to the Senate for
possible ratification, Warren Christopher, head of the Department of State when Jimmy Carter
was President of the United States, suggested the following reservation to article 5(1), which
indirectly affected freedom of speech:
The Constitution of the United States and Article 19 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights contain provisions for the protection of individual
rights, including the right to free speech, and nothing in this Covenant shall be
deemed to require or to authorize legislation or other action by the United States
which would restrict the right of free speech protected by the Constitution, laws, and
practice of the United States.
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tional, racial, or religious grounds.3 24 Additional international anti-
racism instruments include the United Nations Charter,325 the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, 326 and the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man. 327 All of these documents recognize the importance
of the right to equality and freedom from racism.3 28
B. Domestic Legislation in Individual Countries
In addition to international instruments, the existing laws of sev-
eral nations, including those that accept the western notion of free
expression, proscribe certain forms of racist speech.329 Great Britain's
Race Relations Act of 1965330 ("Act") criminalizes the incitement of
discrimination and racial hatred by anyone who,
with intent to stir up hatred against any section of the public...
distinguished by colour, race or ethnic or national origins[, ...
publishes or distributes written matter which is threatening, abu-
sive or insulting; or . . . uses in any public place or at any public
meeting words which are threatening, abusive or insulting, being
matter or words likely to stir up hatred.
33 1
The Act was the culmination of several earlier attempts to conform
British law to international trends. The final version represents a
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOUR TREATIES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS, MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT, S. Doc. No. 385-3, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. x (1978).
324. Universal Declaration, supra note 292, art. 7 ("All are entitled to equal protection
against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination."); Covenant, supra note 292, art. 20 (while article 19 of the Covenant guaran-
tees the right to freedom of expression, article 20 states, "Any advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law").
325. See U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
326. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (as amended by Protocol No. 3 and
Protocol No. 5).
327. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res.
XXX, adopted by the Ninth Int'l Conf. of American States, Bogota, Columbia, Mar. 30-May
2, 1948, at 38 (Pan American Union 1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23/Doc. 21/
Rev. 6 (English 1979), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPp. 133 (1949).
328. See Delgado, supra note 60, at 362.
329. See, e.g., Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, 1975 AUSTL. AcTs P. 349; Canadian
Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 319(l)-319(3) (1985), amended by ch. C-42, § 319(2)
(1988); Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, §§ 17-18 (Gr. Brit.); Race Relations Act of 1971, no.
150, 4 N.Z. Stat. 3590 (amended 1977).
330. Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73, § 6(1), amended by Race Relations Act, 1976, ch.
74, § 70, and Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, §§ 17-18 (Gr. Brit.).
331. Id.
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compromise between the drafters and civil libertarians who insisted
on provisions to prevent unreasonable infringements on speech. 332
As originally enacted, the Act led to few prosecutions. 333 Writ-
ten materials that appeared fairly scientific and employed no threaten-
ing language could avoid prosecution. 334 In response, Great Britain
removed the Act's intent requirement in 1975. 335 In 1986, Great Brit-
ain amended the Act once more.336 As it now reads, the Act prohibits
the use, publication, or distribution of threatening, abusive, or insult-
ing words that are intended or likely to arouse racial hatred. 337 Under
332. Delgado, supra note 60, at 364. Civil libertarians insisted on provisions stating that
(1) the Attorney General must consent to any prosecutions; (2) only public speech or distri-
bution of materials would be prohibited; (3) prohibited speech must be "threatening, abusive
or insulting"; (4) intent must accompany the speech; and (5) the victim must be a member of
a minority group residing within Great Britain. See id. at 364-65. The Attorney General
provision was included because "[t]he Attorney General is likely to be more sensitive to the
potential threat to freedom of speech stemming from the law's liberal application than local
police, who are likely to be more concerned with public peace considerations." Kretzmer,
supra note 54, at 502.
333. Delgado, supra note 60, at 365 (citing Kenneth Lasson, Racism in Great Britain:
Drawing the Line on Free Speech, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 170 (1987)).
334. See Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73, § 6(1) (amended 1976 & 1986) (Gr. Brit.).
335. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 70 (amended 1986) (Gr. Brit.).
336. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, §§ 17-18 (Gr. Brit.).
337. Id. The sections of the 1986 Act pertaining to racism read as follows:
§ 17 Meaning of "racial hatred":
In this part "racial hatred" means hatred against a group of persons in Great Britain
defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or
national origins.
§ 18 Use of words or behaviour or display of written material:
(1) A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or dis-
plays any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of an
offence if-
(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or
(b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up
thereby.
(2) An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place,
except that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used, or the
written material is displayed, by a person inside a dwelling and are not heard or seen
except by other persons in that or another dwelling.
(3) A constable may arrest without warrant anyone he reasonably suspects is com-
mitting an offence under this section.
(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for the accused to
prove that he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the words or
behaviour used, or the written material displayed, would be heard or seen by a per-
son outside that or any other dwelling.
(5) A person who is not shown to have intended to stir up racial hatred is not guilty
of an offence under this section if he did not intend his words or behaviour, or the
written material, to be, and was not aware that it might be, threatening, abusive or
insulting.
(6) This section does not apply to words or behaviour used, or written material dis-
played, solely for the purpose of being included in a programme broadcast or in-
cluded in a cable programme service.
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the revised Act, a constable can arrest, without a warrant, "anyone he
reasonably suspects is committing an offense under this section. ' 338
In addition, the 1986 Act prohibits private as well as public behav-
ior.33 9 Accused individuals can defend themselves by proving that
they did not intend the words or written materials to be viewed by
others, or were unaware that the words or written materials were
threatening, abusive, or insulting.3 40 Prosecution requires the consent
of the Attorney General,
3 4 1
Like Great Britain, Canada has enacted legislation protecting
minorities from racist propaganda. 342 Sections 318 and 319 of the Ca-
nadian Criminal Code prohibit the promotion of genocide and com-
munications inciting hatred against any identifiable group where a
breach of peace is likely.3 43 The Canadian law also bans the expres-
sion of ideas inciting hatred if such expression threatens public or-
der.3 " However, the Canadian Criminal Code also includes
provisions designed to protect free expression, including defenses such
as truth, good faith, and fair comment on a public subject.3 45 Further,
the Attorney General's consent to prosecute is required. 346 Convic-
tion under this law subjects an accused to the possibility of imprison-
ment for up to two years.3
47
Similar to the Canadian statute, the German Penal Code prohib-
its the advocacy of genocide,3 48 incitement against minority groups in
Id.
338. Id. § 18(3).
339. Id. § 18(2).
340. Id. §§ 18(4), 18(5).
341. Id. § 27(1).
342. See Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 318, 319 (1985). As early as 1970,
Canada's criminal code contained provisions outlawing hate speech. See An Act to Amend
the Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 11 (1st Supp. 1970) (amending R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1970)). A
1985 Report of the Special Committee on Hate Propaganda determined that freedom of ex-
pression did not include the right to vilify, thereby prompting the provisions that outlawed
hate speech. HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON HATE PROPA-
GANDA IN CANADA 14 (1986). The Report found that race-hate speech serves no valid public
purpose and represents a "clear and present danger to the function of a democratic society."
Id. at 24-25.
343. R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 318, 319 (1985).
344. Id.
345. Id. § 319(3).
346. Id. § 319(6).
347. Id. § 319(1)(a).
348. STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] § 220(a), translated in THE PENAL CODE OF THE FED-
ERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 182 (Joseph J. Darby trans., 1987). Section 220(a), entitled
"Genocide," reads,
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a manner that tends to breach the peace, 49 and organization of un-
constitutional political parties such as the neo-Nazis,350 as well as the
dissemination of such parties' propaganda35 and the use of their em-
blems.3 52 In addition, the German Penal Code forbids the distribu-
tion of writings that "incite racial hatred or which depict cruel and
otherwise inhumane acts of violence against persons in such a manner
as to glorify or deny the wrongfulness of such acts of violence.
3 53
France outlaws the defamation of persons or groups on the basis
of their origin or relationship to an ethnic group, nation, race, or spec-
ified religion.3 54 In the Act of July 1, 1972,a 5 France eliminated the
requirement of deliberate intent to incite hatred for the crimes of defa-
mation and racial insult.35 6 Instead, under the Act, an offense occurs
when the victim is actually defamed or insulted.3
57
Italy has enacted one of the most stringent laws implementing
the Convention's mandate. Upon ratification of the Convention, Italy
adopted a statute that provides a one to four year prison sentence for
"[a]ny person, who, in any way whatsoever, disseminates ideas based
on racial superiority or racial hatred. 358 Pursuant to this statute, on
(1) Whoever, with the intention of wholly or partially destroying a national, racial,
religious or ethnically distinct group as such,
1. kills members of a group;
2. inflicts serious physical or mental injury... on members of a group;
3. subjects the group to living conditions likely to cause death to all or some of the
members;
4. imposes measures designed to prevent births within the group;
5. forcibly transfers children from one group to another, shall be punished by im-
prisonment for life.
(2) Not less than five years' imprisonment shall be imposed in less serious cases
falling under subparagraph (1), numbers 2 to 5.
Id.
349. Id. § 130.
350. Id. § 84.
351. Id. § 86.
352. Id. § 86(a).
353. Id. § 131. German law further makes it a crime to deny the occurrence of the Holo-
caust. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 294, at 22.
354. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 294, at 20.
355. Act of July 1, 1972, No. 72-546, 1972 D. 328 (Fr.). The law imposes a punishment of
imprisonment of one month to one year and a fine of 2000 to 300,000 francs on anyone who
"incites discrimination against or hatred or violence towards a person or group of persons
because of their origin or their belonging or not belonging to an ethnic group, a nation, a race
or a specified religion." Id., translated in LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note
294, at 21 n.75.
356. Id.
357. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 294, at 21.
358. Act of Oct. 13, 1975, No. 654, art. 3 (Italy), reprinted in Annex and the Initial Report
of Italy (CERD/C/R.95/add. 1). Article 3 states:
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October 3, 1980, a judge imposed a sentence of three years and four
months on eleven Italian youths who had carried wooden crosses and
shouted "Jews to the ovens" and "Hitler taught us it's no crime to kill
Jews" during a basketball game between Israel and Italy.
319
Other European countries, including the Netherlands and Fin-
land, have adopted statutes modeled after Italy's. 360 For example, in
ratifying the Convention, Finland inserted article 6 into its penal
code, which states that
anyone disseminating to the public statements and other informa-
tion in which a section of the population is threatened, slandered
or insulted on account of being a certain race, colour, national or
ethnic origin or confession of faith shall be sentenced for discrimi-
nation against that section of the people to imprisonment for two
years at most or to pay a fine.
36 1
Although the Scandinavian countries generally protect individ-
ual liberties, Sweden's constitution allows punishment for hate
speech 362 and acts of persecution against national or ethnic-origin
groups. 363 Sweden's criminal law also proscribes hate speech and acts
of persecution against ethnic and racial groups. 364 Section 8 of the
Swedish Penal Code mandates up to two years of imprisonment for
persons who threaten or express contempt for racial, ethnic, or reli-
gious minority groups. 365 Likewise, Norway amended its penal code
Save where the Act constitutes a more serious offence, for the purposes of implemen-
tation of the provisions of Article 4 of the Convention, a penalty of imprisonment for
a period from one to four years shall be imposed on:
(a) Any person who, in any way whatsoever, disseminates ideas based on racial supe-
riority or racial hatred;
(b) Any person who, in any way whatsoever, instigates discrimination or inspires the
commission of or commits, acts of violence or incitement to violence against persons
because they belong to a national, ethnic, or racial group.
Id.
359. Around the World; 11 Youths Sentenced in Italy for Anti-Semitic Acts, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1980, at A5.
360. See J. INGLtS, STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 119/10 (1983).
361. FIN. PENAL CODE art. 6(a).
362. INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT, reprinted in 17 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUN-
TRIES OF THE WORLD ch. 2, art. 13 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1985).
363. Id.
364. SWED. PENAL CODE ch. 16, § 8, reprinted in The Penal Code of Sweden as Amended
January 1st, 1972 (Thursten Sellin trans., 1972).
365. Id. Section 8 provides as follows:
If a person publicly or otherwise in a statement or other communication which is
spread among the public threatens or expresses contempt for an ethnic group or
other such group with allusion to race, skin color, national or ethnic origin or reli-
Racist Police Humor
to read as follows:
Anyone who threatens, insults, or exposes any person or
groups of persons to hatred, persecution or contempt on account of
their religion, race, colour, or national or ethnic origin by means of
a public utterance or by other means of communication brought
before, or in any other way disseminated among the general public,
shall be punished by fines or imprisonment [of] up to two years. 366
Australia and New Zealand also have enacted laws restricting
racist speech. Australia's Racial Discrimination Act of 1975367 makes
it unlawful to publish or display an advertisement or notice that indi-
cates an intention
to do any act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction or pref-
erence based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the rec-
ognition, enjoyment or exercise ... of any human right or funda-
mental freedom in the political, economic, social, cultural or any
other field of public life.
368
Similarly, New Zealand's Race Relations Act of 1971, as amended in
1977,369 criminalizes incitement to racial disharmony.370 This in-
cludes the publication or distribution of written or spoken material
likely to incite hostility or ill-will against any group.3 71
Notwithstanding the problems associated with suppression of
speech, these countries have not been deterred in their attempts to
eradicate racist speech.372 On the contrary, "[tihe experience of coun-
tries with anti-hate laws shows [that] while these difficulties exist, and
should not be ignored, they do not undermine either the rule of law,
or the possibility of restraining certain types of racist speech. '3 73
While both the Convention and many nations' domestic laws
criminalize the most egregious forms of racist speech, they do not ban
all ideas about differences among races. Rather, prosecution results
gious creed, he shall be sentenced for agitation against ethnic group to imprisonment
for at most two years, or, if the crime is petty, to pay a fine.
Id. (emphasis added).
366. NOR. PENAL CODE ch. 15, reprinted in Initial Report (CERD/C/R.24/Add.3),
amending ch. 15 of the Penal Code.
367. Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, 1975 AUsTL. AcTs P. 349.
368. Id. §§ 9(1), 16.
369. Race Relations Act of 1971, no. 150, 4 N.Z. Stat. 3590 (amended 1977).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. See supra notes 329-71 and accompanying text.
373. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 490.
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only if there is discrimination, connection to violence, or messages of
inferiority, hatred, or persecution. According to one author, this view
constitutes "the emerging global standard, ' ' 374 which, "in a world be-
reft of agreement on many things, is a mark of collective human
progress. ' 3
75
The United States stands alone among democratic countries in
its refusal to accept this evolving world standard.376 This refusal
stems from the United States' extreme commitment to First Amend-
ment principles. 377 Yet even the United States must concede that, as
government employees, police officers do not enjoy an absolute and
unequivocal right to freedom of expression.378 In fact, by condemn-
ing racist speech in general, the Convention and the laws of other
nations clearly demonstrate the international view that police officers
do not have the right to engage in racist speech, even if that speech is
characterized as "blue humor." Thus, in accordance with article 4 of
the Convention, the LAPD must "adopt immediate and positive
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of ... dis-
crimination ... [including declaring as] an offense punishable by law
all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, [or]
incitement to racial discrimination.
'379
V. A REGULATION WITH A BITE
Although the LAPD's policy against racism disapproves of ra-
cially and ethnically-oriented remarks, referring to such messages as
"inappropriate, ' 38 0 the policy is not enforced. 38' Indeed, the officers'
blatant disregard for the policy is apparent in the content of their
MDT transmissions.
38 2
This Comment proposes that the LAPD implement a new regu-
lation--one with a bite. An example of such a regulation is the 1980
San Francisco Civil Service Policy, under which city officials and em-
ployees can be demoted, suspended, or dismissed for uttering racial
slurs while on duty.38 3
374. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2348.
375. Id. at 2359.
376. See id. at 2346; Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 449.
377. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2348.
378. See supra notes 247-64, 277-90 and accompanying text.
379. Convention, supra note 281, art. 4(a).
380. For the text of the LAPD's policy against racist messages, see supra note 27.
381. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 1-3, 18-24 and accompanying text.
383. Philip Hager, Employees Could be Fired: S.F. Civil Service Panel Bans Use of Slurs on
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The new regulation could employ elements of both Professor
Matsuda's idea of criminalizing racist speech 38 and Professor Del-
gado's proposal of a separate tort,385 and incorporate parts of Great
Britain's Public Order Act of 1986. To be actionable under the pro-
posed LAPD regulation, the racial insult should be one that (1) de-
means through reference to race;386 (2) is either directed at an
individual 387 or against a definable group that has been historically
oppressed;388 (3) is prosecutorial, hateful, and degrading;3 89 and
(4) is of such a nature that a reasonable person would recognize it as
Job, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1980, § I, at 1; see also Thompson v. City of Minneapolis, 300
N.W.2d 763 (Minn. 1980) (upholding dismissal of city employee, under city civil service com-
mission rule prohibiting language "wantonly offensive" to the public, for making subsequently
published racist remarks in presence of newspaper reporter).
384. Professor Mari Matsuda has proposed formal criminal and administrative sanctions
for the most egregious forms of racist hate messages. Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2321. While
recognizing the necessity for a narrow definition of what constitutes racist speech in order to
preserve First Amendment values, she argues that
[r]acist speech is best treated as a sui generis category, presenting an idea so histori-
cally untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and degrada-
tion of the very classes of human beings who are least equipped to respond that it is
properly treated as outside the realm of protected discourse.
Id. at 2357. Professor Matsuda also identifies three characteristics of the most offensive forms
of racist speech: (1) messages that convey racial inferiority; (2) messages directed against his-
torically oppressed groups; and (3) messages that are persecutorial, hateful, and degrading.
Id.
385. In contrast to Professor Matsuda's proposed criminalization, Professor Richard Del-
gado has advanced the idea of a separate tort action for victims of racist speech. Delgado,
supra note 51, at 134. Professor Delgado argues that an independent tort action is both appro-
priate and necessary, because it would eliminate the problems of existing tort remedies and
would protect all victims of racial insults. Id. at 134, 165. Specifically, he proposes that a
plaintiff should be required to prove the following facts in order to prevail in an action for
racial insult:
Language was addressed to him or her by the defendant that was intended to demean
through reference to race; that the plaintiff understood as intended to demean





388. See Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2357. The LAPD regulation should include this re-
quirement because the racist comments found in the MDT transmissions were generally not
directed at the victims. For examples of blue humor, see supra notes 1-3, 13-15, 20 and accom-
panying text. See also Schwartz, supra note 93, at 774. Commentator Deborah Schwartz
notes that "[r]acial epithets aimed at groups may have an even more deleterious effect than
individual insults since they paint negative stereotypes with a 'broader brush.' " Id. (quoting
Hadley Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups,
1974 Sue. CT. REV. 281, 292).
389. See Matsuda, supra note 34, at 2357.
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a racial insult.390 As set out in San Francisco's Civil Service Policy, a
racial insult can be defined as a word that "by its very utterance in-
flicts injury, offers little opportunity for response, appeals not to ra-
tional faculties or is an unessential or gratuitous part of any
exposition of fact or opinion. ' 391
Under this rule, both the epithets "you damn nigger" and "those
damn Japs" would be actionable. In contrast, "you incompetent
fool" would not be actionable because, although insulting, the epithet
lacks a racial component.392 Racist blue humor, such as that found in
the MDT transmissions, would be actionable whether or not directed
at a particular victim. Although typically one is not harmed by what
one does not know, racist blue humor can lead to racist behavior,
including excessive force by police officers against minorities. In this
situation, one might well be harmed by what one does not know.
Punishment for police officers' use of racial slurs, epithets, and
jokes could include demotion, suspension, or dismissal, similar to the
San Francisco Civil Service Policy.3 93 In addition, to ensure against
restricting protected speech, the regulation should incorporate the
British model, which prohibits only threatening, abusive, or insulting
language. 394 In contrast to the British statute, however, an accused
should not be able to defend on the basis that he or she had no reason
to believe the words used would be heard by another.39" Even if the
remark is made privately, such racial slurs can influence the offending
officer's behavior in public, perhaps leading to excessive force against
racial minorities. On the other hand, a person should not be prose-
cuted if the words were unintentional or the speaker was unaware that
the words were threatening, abusive, or insulting.396 In this situation,
enlightening the officer as to his or her offense may be sufficient to
foreclose future offending comments. If the offending comments con-
tinue, however, then clearly the speaker is no longer acting igno-
rantly, and should be prosecuted to the fullest extent. Finally, the
consent to prosecute of the state Attorney General or another neutral
agency should be required, in accordance with the anti-hate speech
390. See Delgado, supra note 51, at 179.
391. Hager, supra note 383.
392. See Delgado, supra note 51, at 180.
393. See Hager, supra note 383.
394. Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, § 18(4) (Gr. Brit.). For the text of Great Britain's
anti-hate legislation, see supra note 337.
395. See Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, § 18(4) (Gr. Brit.).
396. See id. § 18(5).
900 [Vol. 14:851
Racist Police Humor
regulations of several nations, including Great Britain and Canada,397
to help protect against discriminatory enforcement.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been said that "[fjreedom of speech would be illusory if it
did not extend to the expression of views of whose falsity we are con-
vinced and which we find objectionable and possibly dangerous. '398
Therefore, the fact that racism is an internationally condemned social
evil is not, in itself, a sufficient reason for banning racist speech.
399
However, racism is unique because of its extensive history and
the involuntary nature of membership in racial groups. °° Added to
this is the evidence that racial insults and "blue humor" cause serious
physical and emotional damage to its victims. 401
The international community has officially condemned racist
speech.402 In the United States, First Amendment guarantees in this
context are minimal and the Fourteenth Amendment requires the
elimination of all badges of racial inferiority, especially when dealing
with a governmental entity. Thus, there can be no doubt that police
officers have no free speech right to engage in racist blue humor. The
LAPD must affirmatively act to eliminate racist police humor within
the Department. Although racism may never be completely elimi-
nated, public authorities such as police officers, charged with protect-
ing society from the physical harms of racial hatred, cannot be
allowed to promote or incite racial discrimination themselves.
Josephine Chow*
397. See id. § 27(1); R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 319(6) (1985) (Can.).
398. Kretzmer, supra note 54, at 458.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 467.
401. See supra notes 66-117 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 291-375 and accompanying text.
* To my parents and Johnny for their constant love and support throughout my every
endeavor, and with special thanks to Professor Laurie Levenson who sparked the idea for this
Comment.
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